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ABSTRACT 
The continual developments in the Iranian nuclear program have caused increased 
concern not only for the United States but the majority of the international community as 
well.  While several rounds of United Nations sanctions have been placed on Iran, this 
has not deterred it from continuing its nuclear advancements.  The United States has 
publicly announced that it does not support Iran’s developing nuclear program and will 
inflict measures to ensure that it discontinues these advances.  While these measures have 
not been clearly defined, Iran has stated that hostile actions taken by the international 
community, specifically the United States or Israel, may result in the closure of the Strait 
of Hormuz.  While Iran has used this threat in the past, primarily in the Iraq-Iran War, its 
full strength has never come to fruition.  This thesis aims to determine whether closing 
the Strait of Hormuz is a viable option as an Iranian retaliation mechanism against 
increased sanctions from the international community and the United States, or a direct 
attack from either Israel or the United States, by analyzing the economic, strategic, and 
military consequences for Iran, the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
States.   
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I. IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Developments in the Iranian nuclear program since the 1990s have been and 
continue to be at the height of controversy between United States and Iranian relations.  
Iran is a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), agreeing to the peaceful 
use of nuclear technology, disarmament, and non-proliferation, but has been found in 
violation of the treaty by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on several 
occasions, beginning as early as 2003.  With such violations, the United States imposed 
multiple sanctions on Iran, and the Bush administration discussed the possibility of 
airstrikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, as they were an existential threat to Israel.1   
With these realities in mind and the current developments in the Iranian nuclear 
program, the question that arises is: If the United States or Israel either attacked Iran’s 
nuclear facilities or imposed a significant regime of sanctions on Iran, as described by 
President Obama, would Iran close the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation?  How would the 
world, specifically the United States and Iran itself, respond to the closing of Hormuz and 
what would be the economic and strategic advantages and disadvantages if Iran closed 
the Strait? 
An in-depth and elaborate analysis of Iran’s nuclear program is outside the scope 
of this thesis; however, a brief history must be addressed in order to establish whether or 
not Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz as a retaliatory mechanism.  In all scenarios, 
there is a cause and an effect; in this thesis, the effect is the closure of the Strait of 
Hormuz, caused either by military offensive action by the United States or Israel, or 
greater sanctions placed upon Iran.  Iran’s developing nuclear program is central to this 
casual mechanism: thus, a brief look into the history of the Iranian nuclear program, as 
well as its present developments, is in order.   
                                                 
1 Asli U. Bali, “The US and the Iranian Nuclear Impasse,” Middle East Report, no. 241 (2006): 18–19. 
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B. THE BEGINNING OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND THE U.S. 
RESPONSE 
Prior to the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Iran made significant strides concerning 
its nuclear future under the Shah.  In 1957, Iran signed an agreement with the United 
States on cooperating in the peaceful use of atomic energy as part of the Atoms for Peace 
Program. In 1970, Iran signed the NPT, and finally, in 1974, it concluded a safeguard 
agreement with the IAEA.2  Iran was encouraged by and worked with the United States, 
France, India, Germany, Denmark, and South Africa in order to build up its nuclear 
energy program.  The United States provided enriched uranium, depleted uranium, and 
thermal reactors to Iran, whereas France agreed to repair reactors as well as provide 
enriched uranium and reactors.  Iran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with India, 
and solidified a contract with Germany to construct reactors in Bushehr as well as to be 
provided with enriched uranium.  Denmark supplied Iran with enriched uranium and Iran 
agreed to buy yellowcake from South Africa in order to support its nuclear goals of 
building an enrichment plant.  While the close Cold War relationship between Iran and 
the United States facilitated Iran in the advancement of its nuclear energy program, the 
United States scrutinized every action taken by Iran.  And, in 1979, after several 
disagreements concerning safeguards and intelligence reports of a possible nuclear 
weapons program, the United States ceased to provide Iran with enriched uranium.  This 
was just the beginning of the lack of cooperation concerning Iran’s nuclear program 
between the United States and Iran and, with the fall of the Shah, this relationship 
became more cantankerous. 
C. IRANIAN ADVANCEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE 1980S AND 1990S 
AND THE U.S. RESPONSE 
The 1980s and 1990s revealed continuous advancements within the Iranian 
nuclear program, and there were “strong indications that Ayatollah Khomeini revived 
Iran’s nuclear weapons program after Iraq started to use chemical weapons against Iran 
                                                 
2 Andrew Rathmell, Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, In Jane’s Intelligence Review 6, (Coulsdon, 
UK: Jane’s Information Group, 1995), 10. 
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during the Iran-Iraq War.”3  During this time, Iran sought out help from several countries 
to continue their nuclear program but, due to pressure from the United States, initially 
only Russia and China were willing to assist Iran in such an endeavor.  Regardless of a 
lack of international concession, Iran was able to continue building up its nuclear 
program and was provided with enriched uranium, money, and technical support by 
Russia, China, Argentina, South Africa, India, and Pakistan.  China abandoned its 
promise to assist in the construction of a uranium hexafluoride conversion plant at 
Isfahan, but Iran maintained the blueprint of the project in order to continue moving 
ahead while, at the same time, procuring an $800 million contract with the Russian 
nuclear energy ministry to complete work on a light-water reactor at Bushehr.4  Not only 
was the United States no longer supporting Iran in its pursuit of nuclear technology, it 
also was actively siding against Iran throughout the 1980s and 1990s, specifically during 
the Iran-Iraq War.  The combination of U.S. distrust of Iran concerning its nuclear 
program, Iranian actions directed toward the United States after the fall of the Shah, and 
the constant threats by Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz during the Iran-Iraq War caused 
the United States to further isolate Iran.   
The mid-1990s saw no change to the U.S. perception of Iran and “in 1995 and 
1996, the Clinton Administration and Congress added sanctions on Iran in response to 
growing concerns about Iran’s weapons of mass destruction.”5  These sanctions banned 
U.S. companies from partaking in business deals with Iran as well as prohibiting the 
financing of Iranian petroleum projects.  The U.S. Congress expanded upon President 
Clinton’s sanctions and passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in 1996.  This act 
imposed “sanctions of up to $20 million annually on any company investing in Iran’s gas 
and oil sector.”6  With the continual advancements in the Iranian nuclear program and a 
less than desirable relationship between Iran and the United States, the Clinton 
                                                 
3 Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Real 
and Potential Threat (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), 107. 
4 Asli U. Bali, “The US and the Iranian Nuclear Impasse,” Middle East Report no. 241 (2006): 13. 
5 Kenneth Katzman, “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses,” Congressional Research Service 
(2010): 40. 
6 Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Real 
and Potential Threat (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), 312. 
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Administration attempted to send positive signals to newly elected Iranian president 
Khatami, but to little avail.  The lack of direct talks between Iran and the United States, 
coupled with the outpouring of enriched uranium and reactor progress in Iran, meant the 
Clinton Administration partially agreed with President Reagan’s branding of Iran as a 
member of a “confederation of terrorist states,”7 and associated such a state with weapons 
of mass destruction.  Without knowing the exact intentions of the Iranian nuclear 
program or whether it was being designed in order to arm terrorist organizations, the 
United States prepared for the worst and dually combated terrorism and Iran’s nuclear 
program through the previously listed sanctions. During the administration of President 
George W. Bush, these sanctions continued. 
D. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH ERA 
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 
New York City, U.S. policy toward Iran and its nuclear program became even more 
stringent.  While Iranians were not directly responsible for the attacks on the United 
States, it was still enhancing its nuclear program, and without a clear vision of Iran’s 
intent, U.S. policy toward Iran became more rigorous.  President Bush’s “administration 
undertook multi-faceted efforts to limit Iran’s strategic capabilities through international 
diplomacy and sanctions-both international sanctions as well as sanctions enforced by its 
allies, outside Security Council mandates.”8  There were conflicting reports concerning 
the completion percentage of the Bushehr power plant, with estimates ranging from 40  
percent to 90 percent and, while Iran was a signatory of the NPT, the United States was 
wary of its intentions.  The July-December 2001 unclassified CIA report to Congress 
specified that:  
 
 
                                                 
7 Susan Wright, “Terrorists and Biological Weapons: Forging the Linkage in the Clinton 
Administration,” Politics and the Life Sciences 25 no.1/2 (2006): 63. 
8 Kenneth Katzman, “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses,” Congressional Research Service 
(2010): 40–41. 
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Iran [was] vigorously pursuing programs to produce indigenous WMD-
nuclear, chemical, and biological…despite Iran’s status in the Treaty on 
the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United States is 
convinced Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.9  
With these thoughts in mind, the United States set out on a mission to expose the entirety 
of Iran’s nuclear program. 
Beginning in August 2002, the full spectrum of the Iranian nuclear program began 
to surface as Iran openly declared its long-term plan to construct nuclear power plants.  
Upon this proclamation, and unofficial reports of undeclared nuclear facilities, the IAEA 
began to scrutinize Iran’s program intensely, and discovered “unreported Iranian 
activities over an 18-year period… [including] undeclared enrichment activities, 
undeclared reprocessing experiments and the import of undeclared fissile materials from 
foreign suppliers.”10  While these discoveries were made, Iran technically was not in 
violation of any IAEA safeguard obligations or the NPT.  The fact that Iran was not 
found in violation of the NPT did not deter the IAEA and several countries from 
becoming even more wary of Iran’s nuclear program, thus more IAEA inspections were 
conducted.  IAEA inspections revealed that P-1 and P-2 centrifuges, uranium 
hexafluoride, uranium tetraflouride, and uranium dioxide, all essential ingredients in the 
conversion to and enrichment of nuclear fuel, had not been reported by Iran at the time of 
receipt.  Also, Iran restricted the IAEA from inspecting the Parchin military complex for 
a period of time, and then only allowed them access to certain parts of the site.  Upon the 
completion of their extensive inspection of the Iranian nuclear program, the IAEA 
concluded, in November 2004, that: 
many aspects of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle activities and experiments, 
particularly in the areas of the uranium enrichment, uranium conversion 
and plutonium separation, were not declared to the Agency in accordance 
with Iran’s obligations under its Safeguard Agreement…Iran’s policy of 
concealment continued until October 2003, and has resulted in many  
 
 
                                                 
9 Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress, July-December 2001,” Central 
Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/july_dec2001.htm#3. 
10 Asli U. Bali, “The US and Iranian Nuclear Impasse,” Middle East Report no. 241, (2006): 13–14. 
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breaches of its obligation to comply with the Agreement…Since that time, 
good progress has been made in Iran’s correction of those breaches and in 
the Agency’s ability to confirm certain aspects of Iran’s current 
declarations, which will be followed up as a routine safeguards 
implementation matter.11   
While no solid evidence was found to discredit Iran’s nuclear program 
completely, the IAEA still cautioned “that the existence of a weapons program could not 
be discounted, as a result of incomplete information and a series of unresolved 
questions.”12  Even with the IAEA’s findings in Iran, the United States still believed that 
Iran was concealing its true intentions concerning its nuclear program, based on the 
myriad of discrepancies and reporting violations from Iran’s past.  Britain, France, and 
Germany began to negotiate with Iran in order to remedy discrepancies found by the 
IAEA, as well as to encourage Iran to halt its enrichment activities based on several 
incentives.  The Paris Agreement ensued and Iran agreed to adjourn its enrichment 
activities.  However, this Agreement was too vague in nature and never fully came to 
fruition. Instead, Iran agreed to intense scrutiny by the IAEA while still being able to 
continue with their enrichment activities.   
The Bush Administration’s policy concerning Iran and its nuclear program was at 
the forefront of U.S. policy beginning in 2005.  With stalemates between Iran and the 
EU-3 (Britain, France, and Russia) as well as between Iran and the IAEA, the United 
States became more fearful of the Iranian nuclear program, because they believed it to be 
military in nature, which posed an existential threat to Israel; therefore, such a threat must 
be eliminated.13  With U.S. intelligence reports reflecting that Iran’s nuclear program 
could be used for purposes other than nuclear power, and with Iran’s consistent reported 
violations of materials and progress concerning its nuclear developments, the United 
States had to be prepared to combat this potential threat.  Many options were presented to 
the White House; one military plan called “for the use of a bunker-buster tactical nuclear 
                                                 
11 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran,” International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-83.pdf. 
12 Asli U. Bali, “The US and the Iranian Nuclear Impasse,” Middle East Report no. 241 (2006): 17. 
13 Ibid., 19. 
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weapon, such as the B61-11, against underground nuclear sites.”14  This option never 
came to fruition. The Bush Administration focused their efforts “on passing sanctions 
against Iran at the Security Council.”15  The United States took the offensive and, instead 
of waiting for action from Iran, took action in the form of sanctions against Iran, which 
were supported by a majority of the international powers.  The sanctions affected Iran to 
an extent, but were not enough to influence Iran to halt its nuclear progress. With the 
coming of President Barack Obama into office, Iran’s nuclear ambitions continued to 
escalate. 
E. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA’S APPROACH 
With the continual progress of its nuclear developments,  
Iran vehemently insist[ed] on the right to develop such technology, citing 
international law, the need to find energy alternatives, and the inalienable 
right of developing countries to enter the modern world by harnessing 
what it sees to be the cutting of science… [and] it add[ed] that it has no 
intention of expanding its current nuclear program to producing 
weapons.16   
Such strong convictions coming from Iran at the beginning of President Obama’s 
tenure shaped his policy of consistent and direct diplomacy with Tehran in order to 
persuade it to limit its nuclear program strictly to technology while abandoning any 
developments in the military and weapons realm.  While there was openness on the part 
of the United States for engagements with Iran, President Obama did not lift the U.S. ban 
on trade and investments with Iran. The United States continued to monitor the progress 
of the Iranian nuclear program through U.S. intelligence reports and IAEA inspection 
reports; but, with Iran’s apparent unwillingness to engage in direct talks with the United 
States, Iran’s expressed stance of not attempting to develop nuclear weapons was 
becoming less believable to the United States.   
                                                 
14 Seymour M. Hersh, “The Iran Plans,” New Yorker, April, 17, 2006, 2, 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/04/17/060417fa_fact?currentPage=1. 
15 Asli U. Bali, “The US and the Iranian Nuclear Impasse,” Middle East Report no. 241 (2006): 19. 
16 Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
195. 
 8
The apprehensive feelings concerning Iran’s nuclear program were validated prior 
to October 1, 2009, when it was discovered that “Iran was secretly building a second 
uranium enrichment facility near Qom.”17  While Iran immediately conceded to having 
this new site, and claimed that, like the site in Natanz, Qom also was being used for 
energy purposes, the international community could find few explanations to validate this 
proclamation. Following this discovery, the major powers of the international 
community—the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China—met in 
Geneva in October 2009 and discussed nuclear issues.  The six powers proposed a 
concession, which stipulated that “if Iran [told] inspectors the truth and curb[ed] its most 
dangerous nuclear activities, there would also be co-operation in other advanced nuclear 
technologies, including the civilian power-generation that it claim[ed] to be its sole 
aim.”18  The proposal was neither accepted nor denied but cooperation from Iran seemed 
to be nonnegotiable.   
With such shrewd conciliation tactics from Iran, and its apparent determination to 
continue down the nuclear path, the international community was not shocked when Iran 
announced to the world on February 11, 2010, that its nuclear program, which previously 
could be refined to 3.5%, was capable of enriching to 20%.  This fact alone proved 
President Obama’s conviction that Iran was on a course that would lead to the 
development of nuclear weapons-grade material.19  Iran’s past discrepancies with 
reporting nuclear advances, the apparent lack of willingness to cooperate with 
international powers, and the continued advancements in its nuclear program, were 
evidence enough to motivate United States and international action.  President Obama 
has already declared that if Iran does not to begin to negotiate with international powers 
concerning its nuclear program, it will face “strong and smart economic sanctions.”20  
                                                 
17 Iran Defence & Security Report, “Political Overview: Foreign Policy,” Iran Defence & Security 
Report Q2 2010. 
18 At the tipping-point; Iran, the world and the bomb, The Economist (2009). 
19 United Press International, “Daily Briefing: Iranian Nukes,” United Press International, 
http://www.upi.com/Daily-Briefing/2010/02/10/Iranian-nukes/UPI-84691265812022/. 




While the United States has not indicated that it will take military action against Iran if it 
does not begin to concede to international pressures pertaining to its nuclear program, 
there also has not been an indication that an attack on Iran is completely out of the realm 
of possibilities.  Some further form of action from the United States is in the near future 
for Iran if it does not significantly diminish its nuclear ambitions, and the United States is 
not standing alone in this ultimatum. 
F. ISRAEL EQUALS THE UNITED STATES 
The United States is not standing alone in its endeavor to curb Iran’s nuclear 
program. A majority of the major international powers support this stance; one country in 
particular, Israel, a strong ally of the United States, has considerable trepidation about Iran’s 
nuclear program.  Israel is important in this scenario because Iran has stipulated in the past 
that any action taken by either Israel or the United States would be viewed as an action taken 
by both, thus Iranian counter-actions would not discriminate between the United States or 
Israel because of their special relationship.  There are several theories behind why Iran wants 
a nuclear program: advancements for civilian purposes, covered under article 4 of the NPT; a 
bargaining tool with the United States in order to seek security guarantees from Washington; 
and simply just wanting to say that it has “the bomb” for deterrent purposes.21  Regardless of 
the actual intentions behind Iran’s nuclear program, Israel is standing firm in its conviction 
that a nuclear-armed Iran would be devastating for the international community.  Such fear 
and outright refusal from Israel to accept a nuclear Iran “generated testimony in Congress by 
CENTCOM commander General Petraeus indicating that Israel has become so frightened by 
a prospect of a nuclear Iran that it might decide to launch a strike on Iran’s nuclear 
facilities.”22  The Bush administration did not support such an action by Israel and neither 
does the Obama administration.  Instead, for the time being, the United States is committed to 
austere sanctions on Iran and has not given Israel the “green light” to attack Iranian nuclear 
facilities.  It has already been determined that the United States has not taken military action 
                                                 
21 Therese Delpech, Iran and the Bomb: The Abdication of International Responsibility (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 9–14. 
22 Kenneth Katzman, “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses,” Congressional Research Service 
(2010): 44. 
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against Iran off the table, but an Israeli offensive posture appears to be more likely at this 
stage in the game.  Whether the United States agrees or disagrees with offensive actions that 
Israel may take, it is all the same to Iran: it will retaliate with brute force.   
G. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this thesis is not to analyze the Iranian nuclear program and the U.S. 
response; however, the history sets the stage for the remainder of this research.  Since the 
time of the Shah, Iran has been developing nuclear technology and, in 2010, it is continuing a 
more aggressive plan.  While the United States and a majority of the international community 
supported Iran’s desire for nuclear technology in the beginning of its development, this is no 
longer the case today.  Throughout Iran’s nuclear history, it has repeatedly concealed its 
progress and its resources and has lost the trust of the international community, specifically 
the United States, in its pursuit of nuclear advancement.  While several international entities, 
including the EU-3 and the United States, have attempted to engage in communications with 
Iran in order to craft a plan that appeased both the international community and Iran 
concerning its nuclear program, no proposal has yet to come to fruition.  Iran feels that its 
nuclear program is being discriminated against, specifically by the United States, and 
whether this is actually the case or just an Iranian notion, the United States is going to act, in 
some form or another, to curb Iranian nuclear ambitions.  Significant sanctions have been 
placed on Iran for decades and, in light of Iran’s continual developments in its nuclear 
program, these sanctions are going to increase.  The United States feels that it needs to 
combat Iran’s nuclear program, and whether pressure is applied through greater sanctions, to 
cripple the Iranian economy, or a type of offensive military action, to force Iran to cease its 
nuclear development, Iran will retaliate.  Throughout recent history, Iran has continually 
threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz as a retaliatory mechanism.  It threatened to do so in 
the Iran-Iraq War, and it continues to offer this threat to the international community any 
time discord begins to arise.  While Iran has never committed the act, disputes over Iran’s 
nuclear program are causing the United States to act, and these actions could be the scenario 
that ultimately triggers Iran to react by carrying out such a significant threat.   
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II. STRAIT OF HORMUZ 
A. GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICS AND IMPORTANCE 
The Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, is 
considered one of the world’s most strategically important choke points..  
“Geographically, the strait is bound in the Persian Gulf by a line drawn northward from 
Ra’s Shaykh Mas’ud on the western side of the Musandam Peninsula to Jazireh-ye 
Hengam south of the Iranian coast, and in the Gulf of Oman by a line drawn from Ra’s 
Dabbah on the eastern side of the Musandam Peninsula to Damagheh-ye Kuh on the 
Iranian coast.”23  The strait is approximately 104 miles long and, at its narrowest, is 
between 21 and 26 nautical miles wide.  Iran is the only non-Arab state that not only 
borders the Persian Gulf but also borders the Strait, claiming 635 nautical miles of the 
Persian Gulf coast and 636,000 square miles that borders the Strait.24  The water depths 
in the Persian Gulf average between 40 and 50 fathoms, but in the Strait of Hormuz, 
depths are less on the Iranian side and may be as shallow as nine fathoms.  Due to the 
narrowness of the Strait, all vessels must follow the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS).  
The TSS is designed to prevent collisions in the Strait and has two equal lanes, one 
inbound and one outbound, both of which are two miles wide.  The Strait experiences 
swells and tidal currents throughout the year, when these are combined with reduced 
visibility due to fog or sandstorms, navigation through the Strait can be a challenging 
experience, especially during the summer months.  Long transits in a narrow, crowded 
waterway, with areas of shallow water conducive to running aground, and unpredictable 
weather and current conditions, make navigating the Strait of Hormuz a complicated 
operation, which is undertaken by over a dozen vessels every day. 
 
                                                 
23 R.K. Ramazani, International Straits of the World: The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz 
(Netherlands: Sijthoff &Noordhoff International Publishers BV Alphen aan den Rijn, 1979), 1. 
24 Ibid., 5–7. 
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The Strait of Hormuz is important because of its strategic location between the 
Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, which leads to the Arabian Sea.  It has been 
considered the “world’s most important oil chokepoint due its daily oil flow of 16.5–17 
million barrels (first half of 2008E), which is roughly 40 percent of all seaborne traded oil 
(or 20 percent of oil traded worldwide).”25  While amounts of oil transiting the Strait vary 
from year to year based on international economics, it cannot be debated that 
approximately 60% of the world’s oil reserves are located in the Persian Gulf and the 
primary means of transporting this good, vastly sought after by the international 
community, is the Strait of Hormuz.  While there are some alternate pipeline routes to 
transport oil from the Persian Gulf countries, the rate at which this could happen is 
significantly less compared to transporting it on tankers and sending it through the Strait. 
It must also be noted that the Strait is of international importance because countries in 
Asia, North America, and Europe all depend on the oil that comes from the Persian Gulf.  
The Gulf States depend on their oil export revenues but they also depend on imports as 
well.  The Strait of Hormuz is a vital waterway for the international community but, in 
order to fully understand the magnitude of its importance, the specific products that 
transit the Strait—as well as which countries benefit from the vital waterway—need to be 
analyzed. 
B. ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
1. Iran 
While there are land pipelines able to transport natural resources from the Gulf 
coast countries to the rest of the world, the primary means for exporting these resources is 
the Strait of Hormuz, which makes it such a vital waterway in the Middle East.  The Gulf 
countries are responsible for the majority of crude oil reserves throughout the world and 
Iran has no small part in this claim.  “Iran alone is estimated to hold 11.1 percent of the 
world’s oil reserves (132.0 billion barrels of oil), and 15.3 percent of the world’s natural 
                                                 
25 U.S. Energy Information Administration Independent Statistics and Analysis, “World Oil Transit 
Chokepoints: Strait of Hormuz,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Hormuz.html. 
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gas reserves (970.8 trillion cubic feet),”26 making it the owner of the fifth-largest oil 
reserves and second-largest petroleum reserves.  Such staggering numbers of natural 
reserves make Iran a petroleum-dependent economy, gaining the majority of its revenue 
from oil and natural gas exports. 
While the international economy is always changing and Iran’s oil revenue is 
constantly in flux, oil exports that transit the Strait of Hormuz remain its primary means 
of revenue.  Iran experienced a decrease in oil production and revenue after the Islamic 
Revolution in 1979 as well as during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) and then witnessed a 
steady increase in both throughout the 1990s, which highlights the fluctuation in the 
Iranian economy. Overall, however, “over the longer period, from 1960 to 2002, the 
annual rate of growth was 4.6 percent.”27  Compared to other oil exporting Middle 
Eastern countries, Iran fared the best and was able to sustain its economy primarily 
through oil revenues, despite the fact that its oil production reached its peak in 1974 and 
was on a slow decline until 2002.  Although Iran has the oldest oil fields in the Persian 
Gulf, it is preparing to output above 7.3 million b/d in 2020 compared to its target output 
in 2010 of 5.6 million b/d.28  With such an ambitious increase in the span of just a 
decade, Iran may have a hefty maintenance expense in its future but, from this statistic, 
one can gather that Iran plans to continue using oil exports as its primary means of 
revenue, the majority of which must transit the Strait of Hormuz. 
By looking into the Iranian economy, both past and present, it becomes apparent 
just how much the state relies on its oil exports for sustainability.  In 1999, the Iranian 
economy “relied heavily on oil export revenues (around 80% of total export earnings, 
40%–50% of the government budget, and 10%–20% of GDP).”29    And, in 2008, the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported that “Iran’s net oil export 
                                                 
26 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2005. 
27 Valerie Marcel, Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 240. 
28 Gawdat Bahgat, American Oil Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea (Gainesville, FL: 
University Press of Florida, 2003), 109. 
29 Global Security, “Oil,” Global Security.org, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/oil.htm. 
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revenues amounted to approximately $73 billion…oil exports provide approximately half 
of Iran’s government revenues, while crude oil and its derivatives account for nearly 80 
percent of Iran’s total exports.”30  Without the Strait of Hormuz open to transport the 
majority of Iranian exports throughout the world, Iran would be reducing its revenue 
considerably.  With approximately 40 percent of the world’s seaborne oil exports 
transiting the Strait, and with the EIA predicting that oil exports passing through the 
Strait will increase from 15 million b/d today to 30–34 million b/d by 2020, Iran will 
undoubtedly continue to prosper in this exporting endeavor.31 
While Iran appears content in continuing to export oil in order to maintain its 
national revenue, the last few decades have revealed that Iran also has an abundance of 
natural gas that it could export in order to increase its revenue.  “Iran holds 15.3 percent 
of the world’s proven natural gas reserves (second only to Russia).”32  With this 
alternative, compared to oil, Iran has been able to capitalize on its abundant reserves both 
nationally and internationally.  And while natural gas is less appealing to the international 
market compared to oil, Iran has been able to profit from this natural resource.  One such 
example is the $20 billion contract that Iran and Turkey signed, solidifying the agreement 
that Iran would supply natural gas to Turkey for 22 years.33  This revenue from one 
single country could prove profitable for the Iranian economy, but transporting gas 
through land pipelines is much less complicated than transporting it as liquefied natural 
gas (LNG).  The Indian-Iranian communications concerning Iranian natural gas exports is 
much more of a challenge compared to the transaction with Turkey because the delivery 
process is more complex. A pipeline through Pakistan does not seem feasible in the near 
future, so the natural gas would need to be converted to LNG and then shipped to India 
via the Strait of Hormuz.  With such a profitable trade partnership with Turkey as a 
model, Iran may continue to explore this exporting option, once again, enunciating the 
importance of the Strait.     
                                                 
30 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Iran: Oil,” U.S. Energy Information Administration 
Independent Statistics and Analysis, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/Oil.html. 
31 Eric Watkins, “Showdown in Hormuz,” Oil & Gas Journal (2009): 30. 
32 Ibid., 110. 
33 Ibid., 113. 
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While Iran is beginning to diversify its exports from primarily oil to both oil and 
natural gas, and the Strait of Hormuz is a significant factor in this process, it is also 
important concerning Iranian imports.  Prior to discovering its multitude of natural gas 
reserves, and even today, Iran’s primary import is gasoline due to the fact that it lacks 
refining capabilities.  While Iran is becoming more technologically savvy in this area and 
beginning to utilize this resource more, it does not take away from the fact that “Iran 
gasoline imports approximated 130,000 bbld/ in 2009, nearly 80 percent of total product 
imports.”34  Without this vital resource, the majority of which is imported via the Strait of 
Hormuz, from countries including China, Russia, and India, Iran would face serious 
consequences. 
The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is primarily responsible for the oil and 
natural gas production throughout Iran and, while its abundant supply of these reserves 
has proven to be both profitable and lacking at times, assistance from foreign investors 
has aided Iran in exponentially increasing its profit margin.  By attracting International 
Oil Companies (IOCs) from Europe, Canada, and Japan, Iran has been able to increase 
production in offshore fields as well as to explore new technologies for future natural gas 
projects and oil exports.  And “since 1995, when Iran officially invited foreign investors 
to participate in the development of its oil and gas fields, the two sides signed deals worth 
more than $10 billion.”35  This statistic again points to the fact that Iran depends on the 
exports of its oil and natural gas resources for its primary means of state revenue.  While 
Iran profits significantly from its oil exports that transit the Strait of Hormuz and possible 
future exports of LNG, and depends on this vital waterway for its imports, other countries 
rely on an open Strait for their imports and exports as well. 
2. The United States 
Prior to the 1960s, the United States was the world’s largest crude oil producing 
area, responsible for 50 to 65 percent of the world’s oil and supplying around 20 to 25 
                                                 
34 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Iran: Oil,” U.S. Energy Information Administration 
Independent Statistics and Analysis, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/Oil.html. 
35 Ibid., 116. 
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percent of non-U.S. demand in addition to its own rapidly-rising requirements.36  
Although the United States’ oil production increased throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the 
1970s brought with it increased oil consumption but decreased production, forcing the 
United States. to depend primarily on other countries for its oil imports, making the Strait 
of Hormuz central to this dependency not only for the United States itself but also for 
U.S. allies.  By 1965, the Middle East became the dominant oil producer, thus U.S. 
interest in the Middle East oil sector increased.  While Middle East oil exporters are not 
the main providers of American oil imports, 
The United States has a legitimate and critical interest in seeing that 
Persian Gulf oil continues to flow copiously and relatively 
cheaply…[because] the global economy built over the last 50 years rests 
on a foundation of inexpensive, plentiful oil, and if that foundation were 
removed, the global economy would collapse.37 
Since the 1990s, the United States has relied on several countries for its oil 
imports, including Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia.  While the 
first four countries lie outside the Middle East and are not subject to transportation 
through the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia, depends on the Strait to export a large 
majority of its oil exports, particularly to the United States.  While Saudi Arabia is not the 
sole supplier of U.S. oil imports, and the United States imports less than 25 percent of its 
oil from the Persian Gulf, it has become one of the major partners for the United States in 
the oil market.  The United States and Saudi Arabia share a special relationship, focused 
around oil cooperation and, since the 1930s, American companies have had the 
overwhelming majority of Saudi oil exploration and development projects.  U.S. imports 
of Saudi oil reached their peak in 2003 with 647,666 thousand barrels and then declined 
to 570,137 thousand barrels in 2004, but have been on a steady incline over the last five 
years with imports of 560,823 thousand barrels in 2005, 534,143 thousand barrels in 
                                                 
36 Exxon Corporation, Public Affairs Dept, Middle East Oil and Gas (New York: Exxon Background 
Series, 1984): 5. 
37 Kenneth M. Pollack, “Securing the Gulf,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 (2003): 3. 
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2006, 541,987 thousand barrels in 2007, and 559,750 thousand barrels in 2008.38  With a 
gradual increase in imports from Iraq and Kuwait as well, the United States’ interest in 
the Strait of Hormuz is paramount, as these Gulf coast countries use this waterway as 
their primary means of transporting their exports.  These Middle Eastern relationships 
may prove to be vital for the United States in the future concerning its oil imports 
because, although Canada and Mexico will effectively remain strong allies in the oil 
import market, the United States could lose valuable imports due to its “tense relationship 
with Venezuela.”39 
The United States is concerned with Middle East oil, not only for itself but also 
for its allies, specifically Japan.  Following the United States, Japan is the second largest 
importer of oil and relies mainly on the Middle East for these imports.  According to the 
EIA, in 2007 Japan received 28 percent of its oil imports from Saudi Arabia and 25 
percent from United Arab Emirates.40  The significance behind over 50 percent of 
Japanese oil imports coming from these two countries rests on the fact that they must 
transit the Strait of Hormuz in order to reach Japan.  While the United States is not the 
recipient of this large quantity of Middle Eastern oil exports, it still has an interest in the 
unimpeded passage of oil tankers through the Strait in order to supply its close ally, 
Japan, with the essential natural resource.   
3. GCC States 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981 and its 
membership consists of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), and Oman.  These countries formed this Council based on their similar political 
systems, Islamic beliefs, and free-trade economic policies.  The GCC was originally 
                                                 
38 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Petroleum Navigator: Annual U.S. Imports from Saudi 
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formed to provide collective security for all six countries during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–
88), and together they have continued to build on their alliance by working together 
militarily, through equipment sharing and joint exercises.   Oil exports remain a central 
concern for the GCC countries and an open Strait of Hormuz is crucial to their economic 
security as a whole. 
While all countries bordering the Persian Gulf account for the majority of proven 
oil reserves throughout the world, the six GCC countries possess over 40 percent of the 
world’s crude oil reserves, in excess of 60 percent of OPEC’s reserves, and have been 
projected to account for over 50 percent of the world’s trade in oil by the end of this 
century.41  With such staggering statistics, it becomes apparent that these GCC countries 
depend primarily on their oil exports as their main source of state revenue.  And, over the 
past several decades, the GCC countries’ dependence on oil exports has, for the most 
part, continued to increase.   
a. Saudi Arabia 
Beginning as early as 1935, American companies began to drill for oil 
within Saudi Arabian territory but it was not until 1938 when the first significant reserve 
was discovered and exportation began.  Since this time, it has been discovered that Saudi 
Arabia alone holds 21 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves.42  Estimated to have 
263 billion barrels of oil, it is the leader in world oil reserves as well as in oil production 
and exportation.  While it may be redundant to emphasize, Saudi Arabia relies almost 
solely on oil exports for state revenue.  Over the past decade, oil has accounted for 
between 73 and 85 percent of the country’s revenues.43  Saudi has a multitude of oil 
fields throughout its territory, including Ghawar, Abqaia, Zuluf, Marjan, Safaniyah, 
Manifa, and Berri, and each location produces a different grade of crude oil ranging from 
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extra light to heavy.  With Saudi’s biggest importing clients being the United States, 
Japan, and China, it has multiple transportations methods to export its oil but “most Saudi 
oil exports move by tanker from Gulf terminals at Ras Tanura and Ju’ayma.”44  With this 
fact in mind, Saudi Arabia has a keen interest in the free and open passage of the Strait of 
Hormuz.  However, it does not rely solely on naval assets to export its oil and in the 
1980s constructed a 5-million-bbl/d capacity east-west pipeline from the Eastern 
Province to Yanbu, which borders the Red Sea.  Not only does Saudi Arabia rely on its 
oil exports as its primary means of state revenue, but it also is the region’s leading 
producer of gas and has been expanding on this sector since 1984.  The Saudi Basic 
Industries Corporation (SABIC) remains one of the world’s top petrochemical producers 
and these exports contribute to the government’s revenue significantly.  Saudi Arabian 
imports are also vital to its economic prosperity and, in 2008, the U.S. Department of 
State estimated that Saudi imports totaled $103 billion.45  Their imports range from food 
to transportation equipment and come from several countries throughout the world, with 
two of their biggest trading partners being China and Japan.  In order to import these 
goods from Asia, Saudi Arabia has a keen interest in the Strait of Hormuz, as a majority 
of their imports must transit this passageway.  While Saudi engages in trade of goods and 
oil via land routes, the Strait of Hormuz is still its primary vehicle of both exports and 
imports. 
b. Bahrain 
Saudi Arabia is the biggest producer and exporter of oil among the GCC 
states and relies on this resource for the majority of its revenue, but smaller producers 
also rely on revenue from their oil exports.  Oil was first discovered in Bahrain in 1932 
and while Bahraini oil production does not add significantly to the Middle East 
production or export totals, Bahrain itself relies heavily on this commodity.  Its oil 
production has vacillated since its inception, reaching a high point in the 1970s, but on 
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average its production is less than 38,000 b/d.46    Although Bahrain is surrounded by oil 
producing giants, it does not produce even a fraction of what Saudi Arabia or Kuwait can; 
however, its economy still relies heavily on oil revenue, using the Bahrain Refinery as its 
main vehicle.  Bahrain’s saving grace may be that of its Saudi shared field, Abu Safah, 
which produces over seven times what Bahrain can produce and export on its own.  This 
joint endeavor is vital for the Bahraini economy so it is a fair assumption to believe that 
Bahraini interests coincide with Saudi interests when it comes to oil exportation.  Aside 
from just its oil exports, “Bahrain is poor in natural resources…[and] imports virtually all 
of its needs.”47  The Strait of Hormuz directly correlates to Bahraini imports because 
three of its major trading partners are the United States, China, and Japan.  Tankers 
transport the majority of goods to Bahrain and they all must transit the Strait.  While the 
majority of Bahrain’s current revenue comes from oil production, the majority of which 
is a joint project with Saudi Arabia, which it exports both via land routes and tankers 
through the Strait, it relies almost solely on imports for its every day survival, thus it has 
a significant stake in the open and free passage of traffic through the Strait. 
c. Kuwait 
While Bahrain is the smallest GCC country and does not produce 
significant amounts of oil compared to its GCC counterparts, Kuwait, another smaller 
GCC state is one of the top oil producers among them.  Like all of the GCC states, oil 
production is said to be the backbone of the Kuwaiti economy and without its oil 
revenues, it would be in a serious predicament.  Oil was first discovered in Kuwait in 
1938 at the Burgan field and, since that time, multiple oil fields have been discovered.  
Today, the small country, covering 6,880 square miles, holds approximately 8 percent of 
the world’s oil reserves, totaling 104 billion bbl. Kuwait also claims an additional zone, 
the Partitioned Neutral Zone (PNZ), which it shares with Saudi Arabia, that holds an 
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additional 5 billion bbl.48  These reserves are the primary vehicle for Kuwaiti economic 
prosperity and its “petroleum accounts for nearly half of the GDP, 95 percent of export 
revenues, and 95 percent of government income.”49  While Kuwait is looking for options 
to diversify its economy so as to not rely solely on oil revenue for its survival, for the 
near future, these exports of approximately 2.3 million bbl/day are crucial to the Kuwaiti 
economy survival.  Kuwait’s top five trading partners are Japan, South Korea, India, the 
United States, and Taiwan.  The Indian and Asian exports cannot be transported via land 
routes so they must be sent on tankers through the Strait of Hormuz.  Kuwait can also use 
the Saudi Arabian crude oil pipeline to transport the United States’ oil imports to the Red 
Sea in order to bypass the Strait, making this an effective alternative, however, with the 
majority of Kuwaiti oil exports traded to Japan, South Korea, and Indian, Kuwait has a 
vested interest in the free and open passage of tankers through the Strait.  Kuwait is also 
known to possess 1.8 trillion cu m of natural gas reserves but it does not export this 
resource like it does oil.  However, it does import natural gas as well as food and vehicle 
parts.  Its top two import trading partners are the United States and Japan and both utilize 
tankers to transport their exports to Kuwait, which again enunciates the importance of the 
Strait of Hormuz to Kuwait.   
d. Qatar 
Another smaller country that produces a significantly lesser amount of oil 
among the GCC states is Qatar.  Oil was first discovered in 1940 at the Dukhan field, the 
only onshore field, which has since been divided into Khatiyah, Fahahil, Jaleha, and 
Diyab.  Since 1940, three offshore fields have been discovered and Qatar has capitalized 
on these resources to increase their state revenue.  Qatar possesses approximately 15.2 
billion barrels of oil reserves, making it the sixth most plentiful oil reserve country in the 
Middle East.  With such resources, it is among the top 12 oil exporting countries in 
OPEC.  Qatar also possesses some of the most natural gas reserves of all of the GCC 
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countries and capitalizes on increasing its revenue through exporting this resource as 
well.  It holds approximately 890 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, which 
accounts for nearly 15 percent of the world’s total natural gas reserves.  These two 
natural resources are the driving force behind the sustainability of the Qatar economy and 
“oil and gas…account for more than 50% of GDP, roughly 85% of export earnings, and 
70% of government revenues.”50  Qatar’s number one oil importer is Japan, but it also 
exports to South Korea, India, and Thailand.  As there is no pipeline to transport oil to 
Asia, Qatar has to export this resource via tankers that must transit the Strait of Hormuz.  
As the world’s leading exporter of LNG, Qatar is able to use the Dolphin pipeline to 
transport LNG to the UAE, however, non Middle Eastern countries are its biggest 
importers.  And in 2008 “Qatar exported nearly 1.4 Tcf of LNG…of this amount 
approximately 435 Bcf (8.7 million tons [MMt]) went to South Korea, 400 Bcf (8.2 
MMt) to Japan, 300 Bcf (6.2 MMt) to India, 165 Bcf (3.4 MMt) to Spain, and 3 Bcf (less 
than 0.1 MMt) to the United States.”51  Qatar has a significant stake in the free and open 
passage of the Strait of Hormuz not just because its exports of LNG account for a large 
majority of its revenue but also for its imports.  Qatar is estimated to have spent $20.87 
billion on food and machinery and transport equipment imports in 2009.  Its top four 
trading partners for imports, all of which primarily use tankers to transport their goods to 
Qatar via the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf, are the United States, Germany, Italy, 
and Japan, respectively.  With so many commodities being delivered to Qatar via this 
vital passageway, it only enunciates just how much of an interest Qatar has in the Strait.   
e. United Arab Emirates 
The GCC state with the most interest in the Strait of Hormuz may be the 
UAE, as it has had disputes with Iran in the past over Strait sovereignty.  Regardless of 
these disputes however, the UAE uses the Strait has its primary vehicle for imports and 
exports.  The UAE is comprised of seven emirates and its leading three oil producers are 
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Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah.  Oil explorations first began in 1939 but the first exports 
were not initiated until 1963 and, since that time, the UAE has depended significantly on 
its oil and natural gas exports for revenue.  Together, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, and 
Ras al Khaimah account for approximately 97.8 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, 
making the UAE the seventh largest reserve holder in the world.  The UAE produces 
3046 million bbl/day of oil but only consumes 463,000 bbl/day, leaving 2.7 million 
bbl/day for exporting.  The UAE also has a significant percentage of the world’s natural 
gas reserves, totaling 6.071 trillion cu m, making it the sixth largest natural gas reserve 
holder in the world.  It produces 50.24 billion cu m and exports 7.567 billion cu m, but it 
consumes 59.42 billion cu m, so it must import 16.75 billion cu m.52  The vast majority 
of UAE oil and natural gas exports are transported to Asia, with Japan being its biggest 
importer, receiving 40 percent of its oil exports, followed by South Korea and India.  
Today, the bulk of UAE’s oil and natural gas exports to these countries are transported 
via tankers through the Strait of Hormuz; however, there is a pipeline under construction 
that would bypass the Strait and send UAE’s resources to the Gulf of Oman.  More than 
half of the UAE’s available crude exports are projected to be transportable through this 
pipeline, which is expected to be operational in 2011.   
The UAE has been attempting to find alternate sources of revenue and 
“successful efforts at economic diversification have reduced the portion of GDP based on 
oil and gas output to 25%.”53  As the UAE produces less natural gas than it consumes, it 
must rely on other countries for this vital import.  Its main trading partner in this arena is 
Qatar.  The Strait of Hormuz is not significant in this realm of UAE imports because the 
Dolphin Pipeline transports natural gas from Qatar to the UAE and Oman.  However, the 
UAE does depend on other imports, including machinery and transportation equipment 
and food, and its main trading partners in this realm are China, India, and the United 
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States, respectively.  As products such as these cannot be transported through a land 
pipeline, the Strait of Hormuz becomes significant once again for UAE’s imports.   
f. Oman 
The last GCC state, while it is the closest to the Strait, may be the country 
with the least amount of direct personal interest in the Strait of Hormuz, at least during 
the present day.  Oman began exporting oil in 1967, and since that time it has become 
increasingly dependent on oil and natural gas exports as the primary means of revenue.  
Oman has 5.5 billion bbl of proven oil resources, which produce 806,000 bbl/day.  Oil 
consumption is 81,000 bbl/day and exports total 593,700 bbl/day.  Its natural gas reserves 
total 849.5 billion cu m and it exports 10.89 billion cu m.54  Although these numbers are 
significantly high for the region, and Oman depends upon them, it does not need to rely 
solely on the safe and open passage through the Strait of Hormuz in order to fuel its 
economic prosperity.   
Several oil fields lie within Omani territory, including Yibal, al-Huwaisha, 
Fahud, and Lekhwair in the more northern territory and Jalmud, Birba, and Rahab farther 
to the south.  In this thesis, Lekhwair may be the most significant older oil field, simply 
because of its location.  Lekhwair is the oil field farthest to the north inside Oman and 
this is significant concerning the Strait of Hormuz, because its exports do not need to pass 
through the Strait in order to transit to four of its five main exporting partners.  With the 
exception of the UAE, Asia has the monopoly on Omani exports and in order for Omani 
oil to get to China, South Korea, Japan, and Thailand, only the southeastern portion of the 
Gulf of Oman needs to be transited, as Oman’s only exporting terminal, Mina al-Fahal, 
lies near its capital, Muscat.  Concern about the Strait of Hormuz for Omani LNG exports 
is similar to that of oil exports, as well. “During 2008, Oman exported approximately 385 
Bcf of LNG, nearly two-thirds of which went to South Korea, while the remainder went 
to Japan, India, Taiwan, and Spain.”55  Oman has several gas fields but, similar to the 
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majority of its oil fields, they do not lie close to the Strait of Hormuz.  Specifically, 
Oman’s newer developing fields, Khazzam and Makarem, are located in country, farther 
inland and south from Muscat, its Sham field, located in Block 44, also a significant 
distance from the Strait, and its Kauther field located approximately 250KM inland from 
Muscat.  While all of these oil and natural gas fields do not lie directly in the Strait of 
Hormuz, and the majority of the exports do not have to transit the Strait, with developing 
discoveries and projects in Oman, this may not be the case in the future. 
Oman’s West Bukha oil field is one specific example of possible greater 
personal and direct interest in Oman’s interest in the Strait of Hormuz.  West Bukha is 
located in Block 8, directly offshore in the Strait of Hormuz.  While production is still 
making progress, “initial flow rates are 10,000 barrels of 42 degrees API gravity oil and 
30 million cubic feet per day of associated gas from two wells produced through a 
recently installed six-slot unmanned platform located in 90 meters of water some 25 
kilometers from the Musadam Peninsula.”56  It appears that Oman is going to rely on this 
newer discovery over the next several decades and, with increased Omani presence in the 
area, as well as no longer being able to rely primarily on the Gulf of Oman to transport 
some of its resources, the Strait of Hormuz becomes even more significant for Oman. 
Although the majority of Oman’s oil and LNG exports do not need to 
transit the Strait of Hormuz, in the future, this may no longer be the case, which will 
increase its interest in the Strait more directly, but Oman has always had a more indirect 
concern in Hormuz.  Strictly because of the location of its Musadam Peninsula, directly 
next to the Strait of Hormuz, Oman has always had a concern in it, specifically 
concerning its GCC partners.  While Oman alone does not solely depend on it for import 
and export traffic, as a majority of the other GCC states do, Oman is overall concerned 
with regional security.  Iran has always presented a strong presence in the Strait of 
Hormuz region and has challenged its security and free and open passage throughout 
history.  “Control of the shipping channels through the Strait would give Iran added 
leverage over a large part of the world’s oil traffic as well as many of the Gulf’s 
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imports.”57  Oman has always focused on more peaceful means in dealing with Iran and 
its possible pursuit of regional hegemony and control over the Strait; however, it also 
supported the United States’ pursuit to curb Iranian military and economic actions that 
affected other GCC states.  The bottom line is that Oman is concerned with Iranian 
aggression concerning the Strait of Hormuz and although its economy would not suffer as 
much as some other GCC states, the overall regional security is important to Oman and 
the free and open passage of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is central to this goal. 
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III. IRAQ-IRAN WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to understand whether or not Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz in 
retaliation against either an attack from Israel or the United States or from greater sanctions 
being placed upon it due to its refusal to abandon its nuclear program, a look into a specific 
moment in history where Iran flirted with this idea needs to be examined.  The Iraq-Iran 
War (1980–88), also known as the First Gulf War, was an eight-year battle between 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran.  While the war began with Iraqi 
offensive maneuvers, as time progressed throughout the eight years, the tides shifted and 
instead of their initial defensive force, the Iranian military conducted offensive exercises.  
After hundreds of thousands of deaths, economic hardship, and no real victor, the war 
officially ended when both sides accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, 
which called for a ceasefire and the return to pre-war territorial boundaries between Iraq 
and Iran.  The war was fought both on land and at sea and, while territory was gained and 
lost by ground forces, naval engagements and strategic operations contributed greatly to the 
conclusion of the war.  One such significant aspect of the Iraq-Iran War was the strategy 
used concerning the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.   
This section aims to indentify the role of the Strait of Hormuz during the war by 
analyzing actions taken by Iran concerning the Strait, United States pressure on Iran, and 
land mines and attacks on vessels in the Strait, in order to understand why Iran did not 
close the Strait during the War.  It will begin with a brief synopsis of the Iraq-Iran War, 
including the fighting forces of both sides and significant milestones reached; proceed to 
focusing solely on Iranian actions during the war specifically paying close attention to its 
actions during the Tanker War period in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, 
including the use of land mines and attacks on naval vessels, as well as the United States’ 
role concerning the Strait; then address alternate courses of action that Iran could have 
taken concerning the Strait of Hormuz; and conclude will an insight into why Iran did not 
close the Strait of Hormuz during the War.  
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B. THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR IN SHORT 
The Iraq-Iran War (1980–88) can best be described as being “in the classic mould 
in that it represented not simply—or principally—a dispute over territory, but rather a 
contest over power and ideas.”58  This statement is solidified by the fact that at the end of 
the long, eight-year war, neither Iraq nor Iran could claim to be the true victor because 
they had endured economic hardship and the loss of lives, not new land to claim as their 
prized possession.  The war officially began in September 1980, but the year leading up 
to the Iraqi invasion of Iran cannot be overlooked.   
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi fled Iran in January 1979 and, shortly after, his 
regime was overthrown by Ayatollah Khomeini during the Islamic Revolution.  In April, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran was officially declared with Ayatollah Khomeini as its 
supreme leader and this new regime brought with it significant changes from the days of 
the Shah.  As the Islamic Republic rested on the pillars of Islam, Saddam Hussein was 
viewed as a hindrance.  And as a member of the Iranian leadership, Hujjat al-Islam Sadeq 
Khalkhali stated, “we have taken the path of true Islam and our aim in defeating Saddam 
Hussein lies in the fact that we consider him the main obstacle to the advance of Islam in 
the region.”59  With this statement in mind, the Islamic Republic began to urge Iraqis to 
revolt against the Ba’ath regime.  They also reinitiated support for the Kurds in Iraq as 
well as Shi’a movements that attacked Iraqi officials.  While the Islamic Republic was 
assisting in the attempts on prominent Iraqi leaders’ lives and extracting their foreign 
ambassador from Iraq, the newly ascended president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, was not 
fighting back in 1979.  In fact, instead of attacking a brand new regime, Saddam invited 
the leaders of the Islamic Republic into Iraq and wanted to establish peaceful relations 
and co-existence with Iran.  With his offer on the table, Saddam was left standing alone, 
and as the Islamic Republic was not showing any signs of peacefully co-existing with the 
Iraqi regime, Saddam began to take action.  He sought out the Shi’a who were attacking 
his officials and expelled them from Iraq and then fighting along the border began.  With 
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his realist mentality, Saddam saw the Islamic Republic as an unrelenting force that 
needed to be contained and believed that “the only way to deflect the Iranian threat was 
to exploit Iran’s temporary weakness following the revolution and to raise the stakes for 
both sides by resorting to overt, state-supported armed force.”60  With this thought ever 
present, the Iraq-Iran War officially began in September 1980 when Iraqi forces invaded 
Iran after officially annulling the 1975 Algiers Agreement, in which Iraq 
“abandon[ed]…its claim to full sovereignty over the whole of the Shatt al-Arab waterway 
and…agree[d] that the Thalweg (or median line of the deepest channel) should 
thenceforth constitute the boundary between Iran and Iraq.”61 
During the first three months of the war, Iraq was on the complete offensive and 
was able to conquer the Shatt al-Arab and Khorramshahr and conduct an air raid on 
Iran’s main oil terminal while Iran was primarily fixed on the defensive, less one 
significant attack on Iraq’s nuclear research center.  While Iran rejected Saddam’s 
ceasefire in the beginning of the war, it was not until January of 1981 that Iran began to 
actively take the offensive.  In Iran’s first move after about an eight-month stalemate, 
military forces attempted to break the Iraqi lines near Susangerd but were only successful 
for a few days until Iraqi forces were able to “envelop the advancing Iranian division and 
almost annihilate it in one of the largest tank battles of the war.”62 
By the spring of 1981, both sides had been able to regroup and reorganize, but 
Iran was able to capitalize on this more than Iraq.  Iran was able to push Iraqi forces out 
of Susangerd and then advance to Abadan, lifting the siege.  During this time, Iran had 
rejected another ceasefire initiated by Saddam during Ramadan and Iraqi morale was in a 
downward spiral.  Iran capitalized on this loss of momentum on the Iraqi side and 
initiated Operation Jerusalem Way.  For approximately a week, the two forces fought 
amid terrible weather conditions and, by the end, “Iran had retaken the town of Bostan 
and forced the Iraqis to retreat and redeploy.”63  Upon this defeat, with Iraqi morale even 
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lower than before, Saddam agreed to depart Iran if a negotiated settlement would follow.  
These statements only enraged Iran; their next set of offensive tactics came in the spring 
of 1982. 
The Iranian forces began Operation Undeniable Victory and it was the largest 
campaign since the beginning of the war.  Through this Iran was able to drive Iraqi forces 
out of the Dezful Shush area and then continued on with Operation Jerusalem where Iran 
regained the territory that Iraq had first conquered, Khorramshahr.  At the end of this 
two-day battle, “the panic-stricken Iraqis fled in large numbers, leaving behind a 
substantial amount of military equipment and some 12,000 of their own troops to become 
prisoners of war.”64  With Iraqi forces sustaining defeat after defeat, the Iranians only 
used this as momentum to continue fighting all the while rejecting Saddam’s ceasefire 
proposals. 
Saddam ultimately extracted his forces from inside Iran and staged them on the 
border in order to show Iran that he wanted to begin negotiations.  This signaling was 
ignored and instead Iran initiated Operation Ramadan, followed by Operation Muslim Ibn 
Aqil, then Operation Muharram, Operation Before Dawn, and Operation Dawn 1–4.  
Each of these Iranian offensive campaigns either penetrated only slightly into Iraq 
territory including Basra, Amara, Kurdistan, and Penjwin, or their advances were 
unsuccessful.   
In February 1984, the Tanker wars began, which will be expanded upon in a later 
section.  Fighting continued between both sides and, on February 7, “the two sides were 
soon engaged in what came to be known as the ‘first war of the cities’ (there would be 
five such wars before the end of the war).”65  By the end of 1984, Iran had made the most 
progress through Operation Dawn 5 and 6, which was the largest Iranian offensive 
campaign to date. Iran continued with Operation Khaibar and Operation Dawn 7 but was 
only able to occupy limited territory in Mehran and Majnun Island.  In 1985, the Iraqi 
offensive moved to take Qasr-e-Shirin and failed but was successful in air raids against 
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Kharg Island.  The Iranian forces during 1985 failed to take Basra during Operation Badr 
and then continued with their offensive campaign in Kurdistan.  That year also witnessed 
the second war of the cities.  By 1986, the United Nations proposed a resolution for a 
ceasefire after Iraq had attacked Majnun Islam and Iran captured the Fao Peninsula in 
Operation Dawn 8 and conducted an offensive into Kurdistan in Operation Dawn 9.  By 
the end of this year, Iraq had captured Mehran but then lost it to Iran during Operation 
Karbala 1 and had several successful air raids on Iranian oil terminals.  Iran continued 
with Operation Karbala 2–4 with offensive campaigns in Kurdistan, the Fao Peninsula, 
and Basra.   
Nineteen-eighty-seven experienced the third and fourth war of the cities.  Iran 
initiated Operation Karbala 5–9 and moved toward Basra, where it sustained heavy 
casualties and a loss, the Sumar area, Kurdistan, and the Qasr-e-Shirin area.  They also 
undertook Operation Fatah 4 in Kurdistan.  Significant effects on shipping through the 
Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz occurred during 1987 as well, and this will be 
analyzed in more depth in the proceeding sections.  Finally, the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 598, calling for a ceasefire and while Iraq accepted it, Iran rejected it.  
In 1988, after the fifth war of the cities, Iraqi offensive actions in Halabja, the recapturing 
of the Fao Peninsula and territory around Salamcheh by Iraq, the driving of Iranian forces 
out of Majnun Island, and eventually pushing back into Iranian territory and then 
retreating, both Iraq and Iran finally were ready to begin peace talks in Geneva in August.   
C. IRANIAN ACTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND STRAIT OF HORMUZ 
1. Direct/Indirect Attacks on Merchant Vessels 
While Iran had sustained years of attacks on their oil terminals and exporting 
facilities, they had yet to attack merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf.  Because Iraq did 
not have many direct targets, Iran took a different approach in order to combat Iraq in the 
Gulf and “in the absence of Iraqi targets the only alternatives were those ships trading 
with her Gulf allies…[and] attacks upon them, therefore, became part of Iran’s own 
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indirect strategy.”66  Nineteen-eighty-four brought with it the beginning of Iranian attacks 
on merchant vessels and the first attack came on May 13, 1984 against a Kuwaiti tanker 
Umm Casbah.  This attack did come as a shock to Iraq because Iran had been making 
threats about closing the Strait of Hormuz but had yet to make good on that promise, so 
Iraq believed that Iran was full of empty threats.  But “Iran’s patience [had] worn out and 
she was prepared to retaliate against Iraq’s friends as the Gulf War maritime struggle 
entered a new phase.”67 
As Iraq had “declared a “total exclusion zone” around Kharg Island, Iran’s 
principal export terminal,”68 and was attacking Iranian friendly vessels, Iran continued on 
with its maritime campaign and fired upon another Kuwaiti tanker, Bahrah, as well as a 
Saudi tanker, Yanbu Pride.  Both of these attacks occurred outside of designated war 
zones, so any doubts that Iraq had about Iran’s commitment, was quelled.  While these 
attacks caused an international commotion, Iran justified the attacks “as a response to the 
aid given by a number of regional states to Iraq and the indivisibility of security in the 
Gulf.”69  Iraq retaliated by hitting Panamanian, Iranian, and Liberian naval vessels and in 
one month “nine merchant vessels [were] known to have been hit: five by the Iraqis and 
the remainder by the Iranians.”70 
Iran continued with its attacks on merchant shipping in the Gulf and attacked 
another Kuwaiti tanker, Kazimah, near Lavan Island but also began to search vessels 
entering the Gulf.  While Iran was mainly looking for any type of weapons going into 
Iraq, their ability to stop any and all traffic transiting the Strait of Hormuz “demonstrated 
Iran’s regional dominance in a vital waterway and her determination to use that power.”71  
While Iraq could not prevent Iran from seizing and searching every vessel that transited 
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the Strait of Hormuz, they could retaliate against it and thus more attacks off of Kharg 
Island were initiated by Iraq.  In response to these attacks, Iran again began assaults on 
Iraqi friendly vessels.  Iran hit a Liberian tanker, Primrose, and a Gibraltar tanker, British 
Reform.  This escalation in attacks and counterattacks was a direct result of the Iraqi 
denial of a truce in the Gulf as Rafsanjani made the statement that “we declare to the 
United Nations that if the Iraqis do not strike in the Persian Gulf we will not fire even one 
bullet.”72  As oil revenue was a major source of income for both the Iraqis and Iranians, 
Iran realized this and wanted to ensure that its economy would survive the war and if the 
fighting in the Gulf would stop, they were confident that this would be possible.  But with 
Iraq’s outright refusal to such a partial peace agreement and with its continuous attacks 
on Iranian and Iranian friendly vessels around Kharg Island, Iran had no choice but to 
respond yet again and with more force than it had exerted previously. 
Iran continued attacking Iraqi bound vessels in the Gulf and “beginning on 15 
August [hit] eight ships, most of which were trading with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.”73  
While Iran did not hit every single target that it fired upon, it attacked the Pakistani 
tankers, Johar and Endeavor, the Panamanian tankers, Cleo I, Gaz Fountain, and Pacific 
Protector, the Liberian tanker, Med Heron, the South Korean tanker, Royal Columbo, the 
Indian tankers, Jag Pari, and Kanchenjunga, the Kuwait tanker, Tariq, and the Spanish 
tanker, Aragon.  All of these instances give an insight into Iranian actions concerning 
direct attacks on merchant vessel but as a complete history of vessels that were attacked 
by Iran is not the primary focus of this thesis, Tables 1 through 4 summarize Iranian 
actions in this regard and are taken from Martin S. Navias and E.R. Hooton’s book 
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Table 1.   Breakdown of ships attacked by Iran, 1984.  
(From Navias and Hooton, 1996) 
Quarter Tanker* GDC Support 
II 5 - - 
III 7 - - 
IV 3/1 1 2/1 
Key: GDC: general dry cargo.  
Note: * Includes liquid gas carrier.  First figure is number attacked, second figure is number sunk/CTL. 
Table 2.   Breakdown of ships attacked by Iran, 1985–86.  
(From Navias and Hooton, 1996) 
Quarter Tankers* Bulk carriers Container 
ships* 
GDC Support 
I.1985 6/- - 1/- - - 
II. 1985 2/- 1/- 1/1 - - 
III.1985 3/- - - - - 
IV.1985 1/- - 1/- - - 
I.1986 14/1 - - - - 
II.1986 11/3 - - - - 
III.1986 11/- - - - - 
IV.1986 3/1 2/1 - - - 
Key: GDC: general dry cargo. 
Note: * Tankers include ore/oil carriers and liquid gas carriers; container ships include ro-ro vessels. 
Table 3.   Breakdown of ships attacked by Iran, 1987.  
(From Navias and Hooton, 1996) 
Quarter Tankers* Bulk carriers Container 
ships* 
GDC* Support 
I.1987 9/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/1 
II.1987 12/- - 1/- 3/- - 
III.1987 15/- 1/- 2/- 2/- 2/2 
IV.1987 30/2 3/1 1/- 3/1 - 
Note; * Tankers includes liquid gas carriers; container ships include ro-ro vessels; general dry cargo (GDC) 




Table 4.   Breakdown of ships attacked by Iran, 1988.  
(From Navias and Hooton, 1996) 
Quarter Tankers* Bulk carriers Container 
ships* 
GDC* Support 
I. 22/- 2/1 - 2/1 - 
II. 9/- 2/1 - 1/- 3/- 
III. 4/- 1/- - 1/- - 
Note; * Tankers includes liquid gas carriers; container ships include ro-ro vessels; general dry cargo (GDC) 
includes livestock carriers and refrigerated cargo ship. 
While Iran continued attacking Iraqi-friendly merchant vessels in the Persian 
Gulf, and searching all vessels that transited the Strait of Hormuz from 1984–87, these 
were not the only actions that Iran took during the war.  In 1986, Iran began using land 
mines in order to combat Iraq in the Persian Gulf.  “Iran’s mine inventory consisted of 
contact and influence mines...[the] most widely used were the contact mines, which were 
either tethered in minefields or floated into shipping lanes.”74  These mines were either 
inherited from the Shah or given to Iran by the Soviet Union or Asian allies.  In order to 
position the mines, the Iranian Navy had to reconstruct landing ships by installing rails 
that could deploy the mines and the Pasdaran also used dhows and cranes to lower the 
mines into the water.  One advantage of these mines was that they would disrupt shipping 
in the Strait and in the Gulf, but Iran did not have to claim responsibility for them.  
However, “U.S. forces discovered a major increase in Iranian mining activities and even 
caught one Iranian vessel, Iran Ajr, laying mines in areas that Middle East convoys 
transited.”75  Regardless of whether the United States or Iraq knew that Iran was 
deploying them, the mines were a successful tactic for Iran and they were able to hit 
multiple targets.  Beginning as early as January the Liberian tanker, Solena, was hit 
followed in March by Maersk Astro.  A few months later, four Kuwaiti tankers, Marshal 
Chuykov, Primrose, Ethnic, and Stena Explorer were all mined off the coast of Kuwait.  
                                                 
74 John W. Partin, “Special Operations Forces in Operations Earnest Will/Prime Chance I,” U.S. 
Special Operations Command History and Research Office (1998): 5. 
75 Christopher C. Joyner, editor, The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy 
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 131. 
 36
These attacks proved that there was “no doubt that in May the Iranians began an 
extensive mining campaign to disrupt trade with Saddam’s allies.”76  Based on the fact 
that Kuwaiti tankers seemed to be the main targets of the Iranian mines, the United States 
soon interceded.  One last action that Iran undertook must be addressed before the United 
States’ actions can be examined and that is the use of the Silkworm.   
“US intelligence had noticed Iran deploying a battery of powerful shore-to-ship 
missiles near Hormuz…the weapon was thought to be an improved Chinese version of 
the Soviet Styx anti-ship missile with a range of 25–50 miles, designated as HY-2 and 
popularly known as Silkworm.”77  As this weapon was more powerful than an Exocet, it 
gave Iran the power not just to damage vessels, as it had been doing with the mines, but 
rather destroy them.  Iran conducted  a “three-day naval maneuvers in the Gulf, 
codenamed Shehadat, Martyrdom…these involved test-firing a shore-to-ship missile and 
ramming a speedboat loaded with explosives into a dummy naval target.”78  
Unfortunately for the Iranians, however, this form of deterrence did not stop oil tankers 
from transiting the Strait nor affect the United States’ decision to escort Kuwaiti tankers. 
2. United States Actions 
Throughout the entire war, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz on 
several occasions as a retaliation mechanism against Saddam Hussein.  The United States 
responded to Iran with counter threats because “the closing of the strait would be serious 
for [United States’] European allies, Japan and, above all, the Arab-oil-exporting  
states.”79  Thus, the United States vowed to do anything and everything to ensure that the 
Strait remained open.  As the United States had a steady presence around the Gulf during 
the war, its first real appearance came during Operation Earnest Will. 
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Operation Earnest Will began when “the government of Kuwait approached the 
United States about registering 11 of its Kuwait Oil Tanker Company’s oil and gas 
tankers under the American flag.”80  It had appeared that Iran shifted the majority of its 
focus against tanker traffic toward Kuwait, so the United States decided to step in to 
protect Iraqi and Kuwaiti interests.  The United States sent two cruisers, a destroyer, and 
four frigates in order to escort Kuwaiti tankers, reflagged as American ships, through the 
Strait.  The first convoy “sailed through the Straits of Hormuz on 22 July and consisted of 
the Bridgeton and the Gas Prince.”81  The three U.S. escort ships, USS Kidd (DDG 993), 
USS Crommelin (FFG 37), and USS Fox (CG 33) along with the two oil tankers 
successfully made it through the Strait of Hormuz and thought that the Iranian threat was 
simply a threat with no follow through, but on the third day of the transit, the Bridgeton 
struck a mine.  This action made it clear to the United States that “Tehran had made a 
conscious decision to take on the United States despite the risks.”82  In order for the 
United States to maintain its credibility, the United States now had to increase the 
number of forces in the Gulf region.  Following the hit of the Bridgeton, the United States 
sent mine countermeasure (MCM) assets to the gulf, to include helicopters and ships.  
The United States also added a surveillance and patrol strategy in the northern Gulf in 
order to deter mining and attacks on shipping.  Between “September 1987 and early July 
1988 the commander of JTFME [Joint Task Force Middle East] conducted over 100 
convoys and operated between 28 and 33 navy combatant vessel serving as escorts in or 
near the Gulf,”83 and in April of 1988, a U.S. asset was directly affected. 
The Pasdaran continued laying new mines throughout the Strait and the Gulf and 
in April “the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts, a sister ship of the USS Stark, fell foul to 
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one while returning to Bahrain after convoy escort duty.”84  While no one was severely 
injured and the Samuel B. Roberts was able to be restored, the United States immediately 
took action against Iran with Operation Praying Mantis.  Pasdaran bases and Iranian 
aircraft and warships were attacked and destroyed in one of the biggest U.S. naval battles 
since World War II.  With such intense pressure from the United States and the heavy 
Iranian casualties that resulted, this battle was a crucial move toward peace between Iran 
and Iraq.  
3. Strait of Hormuz 
Iran undertook offensive and defensive maneuvers throughout the Iraq-Iran War, 
both on land and at sea, but one crucial event that may have either brought a swifter end 
to the war or prolonged it, never occurred.  Throughout the war with Iraq, “Iran sought to 
block the passage of oil tankers to and from the Arab states,”85 and it did this by 
harassing shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.  However, as Iran had threatened to do on 
several occasions throughout the war, it never closed the Strait of Hormuz.  The reasons 
behind Iran’s decision to keep the Strait open were based on economics, politics, and 
military capabilities. 
The Strait of Hormuz is the primary lifeline for all oil shipment throughout the 
world.  “Every 20 minutes or so, it is estimated, an oil tanker passes through the Persian 
Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz…sixty percent of Europe’s, 90 percent of Japan’s and 20 
percent of U.S. oil supplies are from this region and pass through here.”86  Many gulf 
countries depend significantly on their oil revenue, Iraq included.  While Iraq was 
threatening to destroy Iranian oil platforms in order to cripple its economy, Iran 
threatened to close the Strait in part, to prevent Iraq from receiving its oil revenue.  “Iraq 
is the only member of OPEC whose oil exports cannot reach the outside world without 
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crossing foreign territory in the north (Syria, Lebanon and Turkey), or without coming so 
close to Iranian territory in the south that it cannot be said to enjoy territorial security at 
all for its principal means of survival.”87  While Iraqi-friendly vessels transited through 
the Strait on a daily basis, Iran would have completely closed off a significant amount of 
revenue going into Iraq.  However, Iraq did have alternate routes to export their oil and 
“its new oil pipeline through Turkey and Saudi Arabia by-pass[ed] the Persian Gulf.”88  
Closing Hormuz would not have the desired effect of eliminating Iraq’s oil revenue but it 
would have negatively impacted Iran.  While Iraq was receiving goods, weapons, and aid 
from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Iran had to depend primarily on its own exports for state 
revenue.  With Iran being “totally dependent on the Gulf’s shipping lanes for all its oil 
exports, as well as for nearly all its imports of food and war materiel,”89 closing the Strait 
would have done more harm to Iran than to Iraq.  Iran wanted to make a statement to the 
world and closing the Strait would have affected the price of oil throughout the world, at 
least for a period of time, but it would not have crippled the Iraqi economy nor affected 
United States’ oil imports.  Economically speaking, if Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz it 
would have done more harm than good to their own economy, as it relied solely on the 
Strait for its imports and exports.  Another factor that Iran had to consider before closing 
the Strait was not only its own military capabilities but those of the United States and 
other Iraqi allies. 
With the Iranian threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz, “the United States 
announced it would not allow the Gulf to be closed, emphasized the capabilities of the 
U.S. carrier task force on station just outside the Gulf, began contingency consultations 
with its allies and regional friends and stepped up diplomatic efforts to restrain 
escalation.”90 While only a small portion of the United States’ oil came from the Persian 
Gulf, America was going to protect the international community and its announcement 
was a deterrent for Iran.  While Iraq wanted the United States to enter the war, Iran did 
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not want to have a confrontation with the United States.  Iran was a more capable naval 
fighting force compared to Iraq and while both sides suffered significant casualties during 
the war at sea, “there [was] little doubt that any Iranian losses were insufficient to 
undermine the Iranian superiority.”91  While the fact that Iranian military capabilities far 
outweighed those of Iraq’s, the same cannot be said in comparison to the United States’ 
naval forces.  And at the first sign of possible disruption through the Strait of Hormuz, 
the United States “dispatch[ed] a task force (of three warships with some 2,000 marines) 
to the Indian Ocean.”92  This costly signaling from the United States was a big enough 
show of force to ensure that Iran did not attempt to close the Strait.  Iran was extremely 
careful concerning their maneuvers around the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz and only 
responded in kind to Iraqi attacks rather than taking the offensive.  The fact that the 
United States was ready and willing, along with its allies, to enter into the war in order to 
protect the shipping and oil interests of the international community instilled enough fear 
in Iran that it did not close the Strait of Hormuz because it did not want to enter into a 
simultaneous war with the United States and its allies.   
D. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES FOR IRAN 
The Iraq-Iran War significantly affected both the Iraqi and the Iranian economies 
and while both sides were dependent upon revenue from their oil exports, Iran never 
reached its expected projection throughout portions of the war.  As Iraq was attacking 
Iranian oil installations, Iran crafted a plan in order to defend their platforms which 
included, increasing what had been an intermittent surveillance of shipping for war 
materiel that might be destined for Iraq, to a full-scale program of intercepting, boarding 
and searching suspected vessels irrespective of flag or provenance, announc[ing] what 
was to become a standard refrain intended as a warning to the Gulf states and the oil 
consumers to restrain Iraq, namely that if Iran’s oil exports were interrupted, everyone  
else’s would be as well, and it announced plans to diversify its oil export terminals and 
                                                 
91 Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis (London: The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1987), 41. 
92  Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis (London: The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1987), 29. 
 41
specifically to use Ghanaveh and terminals south of Bushire as well as suggestion that it 
might build a pipeline with a 500,000 b/d capacity to deliver crude to Lavan Island.93  
While one of these three solutions came to fruition, the final and possibly most influential 
never did.  
Throughout the war, Iran did search Iraqi-friendly vessels transiting the Strait in 
order to attempt to deter them from assisting Iraq in maintaining its oil revenue.  And, in 
the summer of 1985, “Iran again demostrat[ed] its dominance of the Straits of Hormuz 
and its ability to bring pressure upon Iraq’s Gulf allies by increasing the detention and 
searches of Gulf shipping.”94  While Iran was able to slow the tankers moving throughout 
the Strait, no real consequence came from this action and Iraq was still maintaining its oil 
revenue through this means of transportation.  Throughout the later years of the war, Iran 
continually threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in order to wreak havoc in the oil 
market but as has been mentioned previously, it never took such action.  Iran’s final 
resolve concerning its own oil revenue was to construct new terminals further from Iraqi 
forces as well as to construct a pipeline similar to that of Iraq’s.  Because Iran was so 
dependent on the Strait as its main vehicle for transporting its oil, it could not close the 
Strait without significantly affecting its own economy.  As Iraq’s oil revenue was slightly 
affected as Iran was harassing its tankers that transited the Strait, it was still able to 
maintain its oil revenue through pipeline transportations.  While Iran wanted to begin to 
construct its own pipeline in order to become less dependent on the Strait, “it was 
recognized that this would be expensive and would take at least one year to construct.”95  
Iran simply did not have the money to construct a new pipeline because the price of oil 
continued to plummet throughout the early part of 1986.  It was spending money on its 
military forces on land in order to combat Iraqi aggressions and to push Iraq out of its 
territory and it was not receiving as much money through oil revenues so a new 
expensive construction project was not feasible during this part of the war.  Also, Iran did 
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not construct a pipeline because of “the Iranian leadership’s expectations of a rapid 
victory.”96  The tides had turned for Iran since the initial Iraqi invasion in 1980 and Iran 
was regaining its territory as well as making significant progress on land and at sea so the 
Iranian leadership believed that it could withstand the decrease in oil revenue for a short 
period of time and were willing to forgo the construction of the pipeline as an alternative 
form of receiving its oil revenue.   
This final course of action was Iran’s only option to combat Iraq in the Persian 
Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz without damaging its own economic interests. But Iran 
neither could nor did want to begin construction on a pipeline that would transport their 
oil without having to transit the Strait of Hormuz due to financial concerns, and the fact 
that it believed the war would end sooner than it had.  Harassing Iraqi-friendly shipping 
in the Strait of Hormuz, as well as threatening to close the Strait, were two actions that 
ultimately provoked the United States to enter the war on Iraq’s side. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Iraq-Iran War was an eight-year battle that produced no real victor.  While 
both countries lost hundreds of thousands of lives, expended countless military assets, 
and lost portions of their oil revenues, in the end, neither country gained any new 
territory or became the hegemon in the Persian Gulf.  Iran’s most powerful asset 
throughout the war was the Strait of Hormuz, but this asset also proved to be its Achilles 
heel as well.  While Iran had the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, at least for a short 
period of time, it never took such an action, as it had threatened to throughout the war.  
Closing the Strait would have been an advantage for Iran because it would have wreaked 
havoc in the oil economy throughout the world, it would have proven that Iran could 
control the Persian Gulf, and it would have affected Iraq’s economy as well as the 
economies of Iraqi allies because they would not be able to transport oil through the 
Strait.  Closing Hormuz also would have brought with it multiple disadvantages for Iran, 
which ultimately persuaded it not to make good on its threat of closing it.  Iran would 
have significantly affected its own economy because it used the Strait as the primary 
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means for transporting its oil and it would have provoked an even greater U.S. 
involvement in the war, something that Iran was trying to avoid throughout the entire 
eight-year period.  Iran caused commotion during the war by harassing and searching 
Iraqi-friendly vessels transiting the Strait as well as deploying landmines throughout the 
Persian Gulf, but they never actually closed the Strait of Hormuz because there simply 
was too much to lose in doing so.  If Iran would have constructed an oil pipeline that 
transported their oil out of the country while bypassing the Strait, closing the Strait would 
not have as great an effect on its own economy; however, this still would not solve the 
issue of United States involvement.  And for these reasons, Iran did not find it a viable 
option to close the Strait of Hormuz during the Iraq-Iran War. 
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IV. MILITARY ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES OF IRAN, THE 
UNITED STATES, AND THE GCC STATES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters have focused on the economic and strategic importance of 
the Strait of Hormuz and analyzed a specific period of time, the Iraq-Iran War, in which 
the Strait was of significant importance throughout the course of the war.  This chapter 
now turns to the military aspects of this dilemma of Iran closing the Strait as a retaliation 
mechanism against increased sanctions or attack from either Israel or the United States 
both from the Iranian as well as the American perspective.  If Iran decides to close the 
Strait of Hormuz, there is no question that it would affect not only her but a significant 
portion of the international community as well.  The consequences of closing the Strait 
would be felt not only by Iran, her economy, and military but it would also reach other 
nations of the world and their economies and militaries as well.  The United States played 
a significant role concerning the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz during the Iraq-
Iran War, at a significant cost to the nation, but Iran felt the costs of the war as well.  The 
question that arises now is whether Iran is willing to incur the costs of closing the Strait 
of Hormuz, not just economically, but strategically and militarily.  In order to answer this 
question, this chapter will explore the specifics of the Iranian military as well as those of 
the United States military in order to determine whether closing the Strait of Hormuz 
would be a worthwhile endeavor for Iran based upon her own military strength versus the 
strength of the United States’ and GCC states’ military assets and capabilities.   
B. IRANIAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND ACTION 
During the long, arduous Iraq-Iran War (1980–1988), Iran incurred momentous 
losses not only of her people but also of her military equipment.  The ground forces of 
both the regular army as well as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or 
Pasdaran suffered a significant loss of life and machinery, Iran’s air force suffered 
overwhelming losses in equipment as well as in confidence as the Iraqi air force’s 
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capabilities and technological advances far outweighed those of Iran’s, and while her 
navy was the largest of any Persian Gulf coast country, its shortcomings were soon 
realized.  With Iranian army, air force, and navy equipment and capabilities significantly 
diminished, a restructuring and rebuilding were in order and noticeably began in the 
1990s.  It is not sufficient to look primarily at Iran’s naval capability when assessing 
whether or not it would close the Strait of Hormuz because over the last several years, it 
has conducted joint exercises with all of its military forces in and around the Strait.  Due 
to this fact the following sections will take an in depth look into Iran’s current army, air 
force, and navy strengths, assets, and capabilities. 
1. Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp 
While the Iranian Army does not operate in the waterways along the coast of Iran, 
all of Iran’s military forces would be affected if it decided to close or block the Strait: 
thus, these forces cannot be ignored when attempting to establish Iran’s capability to 
close the Strait of Hormuz.  The Iranian regular army force consists of 350,000 members, 
which includes 6 infantry divisions, 4 armor divisions, 6 artillery regiments, 2 commando 
divisions and 1 special forces brigade among its special forces, and 1 airborne brigade 
while the IRGC consists of approximately 125,000 members, which includes 2 armor 
divisions, 5 mechanized divisions, 18 infantry divisions, independent brigades, special 
forces elements, and paratroop units.97  The army is responsible for the more traditional 
military matters, while the IRGC focuses on the less traditional missions and would be a 
key element in the execution of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.  The vast majority of 
the personnel in both the army and IRGC enter the military through conscription and 
receive only minimal training at the lower levels of these fighting forces.  Inadequate 
training coupled with outdated equipment from the United States and Britain, from the 
time of the Shah, adds to the fact that Iran will need to continue to build its ground forces  
 
                                                 





in order to have a fighting chance against stronger military powers.  Despite having these 
flaws, the Iranian ground forces do have a significant amount of resources at their 
disposal. 
Iran possesses approximately 1,700 tanks, including 100 Zulfiqars, 150 M-47/M-
48s, and 100 Chieftain Mark 3/5s, which is a significant increase from its inventory of 
1,135 tanks in 2000. It has also been inventoried to have T-54s, T-55s, T-59s, T-62s, and 
T-72s from North Korea and China as well as 640 armored personnel carriers, and 8,196 
artillery pieces of which, 2,010 are towed and over 310 are self-propelled.98  While 
experts only have a semi-precise picture of how many of these assets are fully 
operational, it cannot be denied that Iran has been stockpiling equipment for its ground 
forces since the end of the Iraq-Iran War.  Table 5 outlines the Iranian ground forces 
armor, artillery, anti-tank weapons, air defense weapons, infantry weapons, aviation 
assets, and missiles. 
Table 5.   Iranian Army Armor, Artillery, Anti-Tank Weapons, Air Defense Weapons, 
Infantry Weapons, Aviation, and Missiles 
Role In Service 
Iranian Army Armor    
Main Battle Tank 1745 (1,2,3) 
Light Tank n/a (4) 
Reconnaissance Vehicle 115 
Infantry Fighting Vehicle 650 (1) 
Armored Personnel Carrier 640 (1,4) 
Armored Vehicle n/a 
Iranian Army Artillery  
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Self-Propelled Gun-Howitzer n/a 
Self-Propelled Howitzer 240 
Self-Propelled Gun 52 
Gun-Howitzer 120 
Howitzer 1005 
Field Gun 1015 (5) 
Divisional Gun 80 
Multiple Rocket Launcher 750 
Mortar 2250 
Light Mortar n/a 
Iranian Army Anti-Tank Weapons  
Anti-Tank Guided Missile 1520 (6,7) 
Anti-Tank Rocket n/a 
Recoilless Rifle 550 
Recoilless Gun n/a 
Anti-Tank Rocket 740 
Iranian Army Air Defense Weapons  
Man-Portable Surface-to-Air Missile 640 
Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missile n/a (8) 
Surface-to-Air Missile 120 
Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun 
(Twin) 
80 
Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun 100 
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(Quad) 
Anti-Aircraft Gun (Twin) 392 
Anti-Aircraft Gun 550 
Iranian Army Infantry Weapons  
7.62 mm G3 Assault Rifle 
7.62 mm AKM type Assault Rifle 
7.62 mm Dragunov Assault Rifle 
5.56 mm M16A1 Assault Rifle 
5.56 mm KH-2002 Assault Rifle  
0.30 in M1 Assault Rifle 
9 mm Uzi Sub-Machine Gun 
9 mm H&K MP5 Sub-Machine Gun 
9 mm Beretta M12 Sub-Machine Gun 
7.62 mm MG1A1 General-Purpose Machine Gun 
7.62 mm PK/PDK General-Purpose Machine Gun 
7.62 mm FN MAG General-Purpose Machine Gun 
0.50 in Browning M2HB Heavy Machine Gun 
12.7 mm DShK Heavy Machine Gun 
40 mm M79 Grenade Launcher 
30 mm AGS-17 Automatic Grenade Launcher 
Iranian Army Aviation  




 Helicopter-Transport 19 




Mi-8 'Hip'  
Helicopter-Utility 
102 (11) 
Iranian Army Missiles  
Toophan (TOW) Anti-Armor 
Toophan 2 (Improved TOW) Anti-Armor 
Notes: Armor-1. Estimated. 2. Some T-69-II tanks may be converted to fit the 
Pakistani 105 mm gun. 3. Some or all of the M47/M48/M60 US-designed vehicles 
may have been withdrawn from service to be converted into Zulfiqar tanks.  4. Low 
rate production.  Not confirmed in service.  Artillery-Captured FH-77 and G5 towed 
artillery is being upgraded but has not been returned to inventory.  5. Some of these 
are likely Russian-made 130 mm M-46s.  Anti-Tank Weapons-6. Unconfirmed.  7. 
The serviceability of US-made systems remains in doubt.  Air Defense Weapons-8. 
Unconfirmed.  Iran may have taken delivery of several systems for trial purposes 
and/or to upgrade its FM-80 network.  Aviation-About 10 ex-Iraqi Mi-24 “Hinds” 
may be in service.  9. Refurbishments began in 1998.  Ten upgraded “Toufan” aircraft 
reportedly delivered in 2010.  10. Being refurbished (and, reportedly, new-built) as 
IHSRC Shabaviz 75.  11. Ex-Iraqi 
Source: Adapted by Brenna Schnars from Source: Jane’s Online, “Army, Iran,” Jane’s 
Sentinel Security Assessment-The Gulf States. 
2. Air Force 
The Iranian air force faced significant challenges during the Iraq-Iran War and 
similar to the ground forces, the air force has been steadily building up personnel and 
equipment since the 1990s.  The current strength of the air force is approximately 30,000 
personnel and it possesses approximately 300 combat aircraft including the MiG-29, F-
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14A, F-4, and F-5 along with C-130, Boeing 747 and 707 transport aircraft.99  While the 
Iranian air force uses United States relics, it no longer is supplied parts by the United 
States and thus must turn to its Asian and Russian neighbors in order to maintain its 
current equipment or purchase new aircraft as well as work internally to create new 
aircraft suitable for military operations.  Iran has been steadily increasing its production 
of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as well as developing surface to air (SAM) 
missiles based on Russian and Chinese models.  However, even with progressing 
advances in missile and delivery systems, training facilities, like the lower level ground 
forces, are par at best due to Iran’s inability to conduct realistic training exercises. The 
vast amount of airspace owned by Iran makes effective and efficient patrolling of the 
entire area a challenging endeavor for its air force.  And in order to attempt to mitigate 
airspace issues, fourteen tactical air bases throughout Iran are separated into the Western 
Area Command (WAC), the Southern Area command (SAC), or the Eastern Area 
Command (EAC).  Air bases, each of which are the home base for several fighter, 
transport, patrol, or special duties squadrons, are located as far north as Tabriz, as far 
south as Chah Bahar, and as close to the Strait of Hormuz as Bandar Abbas.  Table 6 
outlines the Iranian air force’s current capabilities. 
Table 6.    Iranian Air Force Fixed Wing Aircraft, Rotary Wing Aircraft, Missiles 
Type In Service 
Iranian Air Force Fixed Wing Aircraft  
F-14A Tomcat 45 (1) 
MiG-29 'Fulcrum-A' 48 (2) 
Mirage F1EQ 24 (4) 
Su-24MK 'Fencer-D' 29 (5) 
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Su-25 'Frogfoot' 13 (6) 
F-5B Simorgh 12 
F-7M Airguard 30 
F-4E Phantom II 50 
F-4D Phantom II 5 
F-5E Tiger II 31 
F-5F Tiger II 18 
P-3F Orion 4 (8) 
RF-4E Phantom II 4 
An-74TK-200 'Coaler-B' 11 (9) 
Y-7 2 
747 7 (10) 
747-2J9F 4 (10) 
F27-400M Troopship 10 
F27-600 Friendship n/a (11) 
Y-12 (II) 9 
Il-76MD 'Candid' 14 (12) 
C-130E Hercules 22 
C-130H Hercules n/a (13) 
IR.AN-140 3 
707-3J9C 12 
Falcon 20E 1 
Falcon 50 3 (4) 
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L-1329 Jetstar 1 
PC-6/B Turbo Porter 8 
TB-21 8 
TB-200 4 
F33 Bonanza 20 
EMB-312 Tucano 15 
PC-7 Turbo Trainer 35 
Mushshak 22 (9) 
Parastu 14 (14) 
Tazarve 25 (15) 
. Iranian Air Force Rotary Wing Aircraft  
AS-61A-4 2 
CH-47C Chinook 2 




Shahed 274 2 
Iranian Air Force Missiles  
AIM-9P Sidewinder Air-to-Air 
AA-8 'Aphid' Air-to-Air 
AA-9 'Amos' Air-to-Air 
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AA-10 'Alamo' Air-to-Air 
AA-11 'Archer' Air-to-Air 
AIM-7F Sparrow Air-to-Air 
AIM-54 Phoenix Air-to-Air 
MIM-23B HAWK (16) Air-to-Air 
R 550 Magic Air-to-Air 




(Iran) Sattar-1 Air-to-Surface 
(Iran) Sattar-2 Air-to-Surface 
AGM-65 Maverick Air-to-Surface 
AS-10 'Karen' Air-to-Surface 
AS-11 'Kilter' Air-to-Surface 
AS-12 'Kegler' Air-to-Surface 
AS-14 'Kedge' Air-to-Surface 
AS-16 'Kickback' Air-to-Surface 
YJ-6 (CAS-1) Anti-Ship Attack 
C-801C Sardine Anti-Ship Attack 
(Iran) Fajr-e-Darya (CPMIEC C-802K) Anti-Ship Attack 
RIM-66 Standard (16) Anti-Ship Attack 
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Notes: Fixed Wing Aircraft-Iran still possesses large numbers of aircraft and 
helicopters of United States origin obtained before overthrow of Shah; most are 
unserviceable and figures quoted refer only to those believed capable of operation at 
time of writing.  Inventory totals given about include those of the Revolutionary 
Guards Corps.  1. Total strength; only about 35 maintained in operational status at any 
given time.  2. Total includes 21 impounded Iraqi aircraft’ some MiG-29UB 
“FulcrumB” two-seaters are operated; 35 to be overhauled and upgraded.  3. This figure 
is the lowest estimate of the number of aircraft in service.  4. Impounded Iraqi aircraft; 
in case of Mirage, at least six F1BQ two-seaters and 15 F1EQ single-seaters are 
believed to be operated.  5. Total includes 18 impounded Iraqi aircraft; more allegedly 
received from requirement for 100 ex-Russian aircraft; armed with Fajr-e-Darya 
AShMs; 24 to be overhauled and upgraded.  6. Includes examples of the Su-25K, Su-
25UBK and Su-25T versions, with at least five Su-25K/UBK being former Iraqi Air 
Force aircraft.  7. F-5B converted from F-5A; at least 13 reported to have been 
completed.  8. To be replaced by version of IR.AN-140 Faraz.  9. Pasdaran aircraft 
according to recent reports.  10. Some converted to tanker.  11. Included in total quoted 
for F27-400M Troopship.  12. Including 11 ex-Iraqi; confirmed in service.  13. 
Included in total quoted for C-130E Hercules.  14. Based on Beech Bonanza.  15. Total 
requirement.  Missiles-16. Sic 
Source:  Adapted by Brenna Schnars from Jane’s Online, “Iran-Air Force,” Jane’s World 
Air Forces. 
3. Navy 
Since the Iraq-Iran War, the Iranian Navy has witnessed the spoils of upgrade 
more so than its army and air force counterparts.  While all these services conduct joint 
operation exercises in an around the Strait of Hormuz, if Iran were to close the Strait, its 
navy would be the primary fighting force during such an endeavor.  Currently, the Iranian 
Navy is composed of 18,000 regular navy personnel, 20,000 IRGC personnel with an 
additional 5,000 personnel marine branch, 3 submarines, 4 frigates, 2 corvettes, and 
multiple missile, coastal, and inshore patrol craft, amphibious ships, patrol aircraft, and 
armed helicopters.100  The naval administrative headquarters is located in its capital, 
Tehran, but in order to effectively control its coast, Iran has several naval bases 
                                                 
100 Jane’s Online, “World navies, Iran,” Jane’s World Navies, 
http://search.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwna/jwna0072.htm@
current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=iranian%20navy&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Pr
od_Name=JWNA& and Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 52–55. 
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throughout the country including one located at Kharg Island, at the northern end of the 
Persian Gulf, one at Chah Bahar, at the entrance to the Gulf of Oman, and one in the 
center of the Strait of Hormuz at Bandar Abbas.  These strategic locations are meant to 
improve Iran’s defense of its coastal waterways and ensure that it can militarily react to 
any situation in the waterways between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.  The 
majority of naval equipment owned by Iran during and immediately following the Iraq-
Iran War was purchased by the Shah from the United States and is no longer of the 
caliber to effectively patrol the Iranian coast thus, Iran again turned to its Asian and 
Russian neighbors in order to upgrade its military equipment.  While China and North 
Korea have provided Iran with missiles, patrol craft, and midget submarines, Russia has 
given Iran an extremely effective piece of military equipment in patrolling the Gulf and 
Strait of Hormuz; the submarine. 
The Kilo class submarines now owned by Iran are a modern and effective 
submarine class.  They have the ability to operate in shallow water depths, are equipped 
with mine detection and avoidance sonar capabilities, are surrounded by anechoic tiles 
that absorb sonar sound waves—thus reducing noise, have 6 530mm torpedo tubes, and 
can carry either 18 homing and wired-guided torpedoes or 24 mines.  Beginning in 1992, 
U.S. intelligence sources indicated that Iran planned to buy between two and three of 
these Kilo class submarines from Russia and, in November of 1992, the first Kilo was 
transferred to Iran and was subsequently commissioned the Tareq-901.101  Following this 
commissioning, Iran received two more Kilo class submarines from Russia: the Noor-902 
and the Yunes-903.  The Kilo submarines can fire torpedoes or lay mines with minimal 
detection, and can do so in shallow water; however, the depth of the water throughout the 
Strait of Hormuz makes such tasks more difficult than in the deeper parts of either the 
Persian Gulf of the Gulf of Oman, especially if there is a U.S. naval presence in and 
around the Strait of Hormuz.  If Iran did decide to close the Strait of Hormuz, the 
likelihood of it deploying mines throughout the Strait and Persian Gulf, as it did during 
the Iraq-Iran War, is high and while its Kilo class submarines have this capability, Iran 
                                                 
101 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran & Iraq: The Threat from the Northern Gulf (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1994), 72. 
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has alternate methods for mine deployment as well as other military tactics it could 
employ in and around the Strait, in order to contest shipping traffic.   
While Iran has its Kilo class submarines to lay mines in and around its coastal 
waterways, it also has a wide array of other military equipment that can deploy its mines 
including small craft, its amphibious ships (LSTs), Boghammers, and helicopters.  Iran’s 
navy also “has one to two operational Cape-class (Riazzi-class) 239-ton inshore 
minesweeper…for mine warfare purposes.”102  If Iran were to close the Strait of Hormuz, 
mine warfare would be a key component to the success of such a mission.  As of 1994, 
Iran has been known to possess multiple moored and drifting contact mines purchased by 
both the United States and Russia and with their determination to rebuild its navy it is 
likely that it has also acquired non-magnetic and influence mines as well.  U.S. experts 
estimate that Iran has at least 2000 mines and intelligence has also surfaced concerning a 
report that Iran has negotiated with China to buy the EM-52 or MN-52 rocket propelled 
mine.103  With such a wide array of mining capabilities, Iran would be able to inflict 
damage on naval or merchant vessels transiting the Strait and thus is makes it one of the 
most powerful tools for Iran if it did close the Strait of Hormuz.   
Along with its variety of mines, as well as its ability to lay them through several 
different media, Iran would also rely heavily on missiles in order to close the Strait of 
Hormuz due to its lack of up to date naval equipment and mediocre air assets.  Just as 
Iran used the Chinese Silkworm during the Iraq-Iran War, if it wanted to close the Strait, 
it would have to rely on this specific piece of military equipment.  As of 1994, “the Naval 
branch of the IRGC had three to five operational land-based anti-ship missile units with 
three to six Silkworm launchers each, and a total of 50-60 missiles.”104 Along with its 
Silkworms, Iran has also obtained other variants of anti-ship and ship-to-ship missiles.  
Iran is known to have the capability to operate and deploy the Seersucker anti-ship 
missile, the CS-801anti-ship missile, the CS-802 missile anti-ship missile, and the CS-
                                                 
102 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 58. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran & Iraq: The Threat from the Northern Gulf (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1994), 74. 
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801K anti-ship missile, all of which are deployable from its frigates and have ranges 
varying from four to 70 nautical miles.105  Table 7 outlines the specific naval capabilities 
of Iran. 
Table 7.    Iranian Navy Submarines, Navy Surface Fleet, IRGC Surface Fleet, 
Auxiliaries, Aviation 
Role In Service 
Iranian Navy Submarines  
Attack 3 
Midget 7 
Midget (Diesel-Electric Power)  1 
Swimmer Delivery Vehicle 8 
Semi-Submersible Craft 6 
Iranian Navy Surface Fleet  
Frigate 4 
Corvette 2 
Fast Attack Craft - Missile 14 
Fast Attack Craft 1 
Patrol Craft 19 
Patrol Craft – Large (1) 6 
Patrol Craft - Coastal 26 
Patrol Craft - Inshore 36 
Landing Ship Tank 2 
                                                 
105 Anthony H.Cordesman, Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities (Washington, D.C., Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 55–56. 
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Landing Ship Logistic 10 
Landing Craft (2) 1 
Hovercraft 7 
Iranian IRGC Surface Fleet  
Fast Attack Craft - Missile 10 
Patrol Craft - Coastal, Missile 25 
Patrol Craft - Coastal 45 
Patrol Craft - Inshore 40 (3) 
Patrol Craft 30 
Landing Ship Tank 5 (4) 
Iranian Navy Auxiliaries  
Replenishment Ship 1 
Fleet Supply Ship 2 
Support Vessel 1 
Water Tanker 4 
Support Ship 6 
Tender 12 
Floating Dock 2 
Harbour Tug 17 
Iranian Naval Aviation  
Helicopter - Maritime / Anti-Submarine 18 
Utility 2 
Utility / Transport 9 
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Helicopter - Multirole 6 
VIP / Transport 6 
Notes: NavySurface Fleet-1. Three patrol craft originally built by the U.S. 
Coast Guard, Curtis Bay, Maryland in the 1950s were withdrawn for Iranian service in 
approximately 1995.  It is reported that they have been refitted and recommissioned.  2. 
Described as a commercial craft, but has military applications.  IRGC Surface Fleet-3. 
Manned by IRGC and the Navy.  4. Officially classes as Merchant Ships.  Have been 
used to support IRGC activities.  Aviation- Serviceability of much equipment of U.S. 
origin probably low. 
Source: Adapted by Brenna Schnars from Jane’s Online, “World navies, Iran,” Jane’s 
World Air Navies. 
C. UNITED STATES MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND ACTIONS 
While the United States intervened during the Iraq-Iran War when Iran challenged 
shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf, so too would the United States 
intervene if Iran decided to close the Strait.  The United States is considered a more 
capable fighting force as compared to Iran and in order to fully understand this, the 
following sections will specifically address current U.S. military assets and capabilities.  
While the U.S. Navy would be the primary fighting force in the beginning of a conflict 
over the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the following sections highlight the army, air 
force, and Marine Corp as well due to the joint nature of current and future U.S. military 
operations.   
1. Army 
While the United States Army is concerned with land based operations, if the 
United States were forced to intervene in the Middle East if Iran attempted to close the 
Strait of Hormuz, the likelihood of using joint forces, is a likely scenario, thus the 
strength and capabilities of the U.S. Army need to be outlined.  There are currently 
662,232 personnel in the army; 553,044 active duty, 77,833 in the active Army National 
Guard (ARNG), and 31,355 in the active Army Reserves (AR) while the reserve 
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component is comprised of 358,391 ARNG and 77,833 reservists.106  All of these forces 
are divided into Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCT), Infantry Brigade Combat Teams 
(IBCT), and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT), which are further divided into 
manoeuvre battalions, combined arms battalions, armed reconnaissance (recce) 
squadrons, armed fires battalions, Brigade Support Battalions (BSB) and Brigade Special 
Troops Battalions (BSTB), infantry battalions, and Reconnaissance, Surveillance and 
Target Acquisition (RSTA) squadrons. Aside from its Infantry, the army has 11 aviation 
brigades, four engineers brigades, six air defense brigades, five artillery brigades, two 
armored cavalry regiments, and two armored divisions.   The army possesses a wide array 
of equipment from land fighting vehicles and artillery, fixed wing and rotary wing 
aircraft and UAVs, as well as amphibious assets and air defense systems. While the army 
is still currently engaged in operations both in Iraq and Afghanistan, the force strength 
over the next five years, as is outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) 
of 2010, is projected to be comprised of 4 Corps headquarters, 18 Division headquarters, 
73 total BCTs (45 active component and 28 Reserve component), consisting of 40 
IBCTs, 8 SCBTs, and 25 HBCTs, 21 combat aviation brigades (CAB), and 15 Patriot 
battalions; 7 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries.107   
Training of U.S. Army soldiers is a much more intense institution as compared to 
Iran’s, and each soldier is taught to become a master in his field of expertise through 
vigorous training, both in the field and in the classroom. Along with this superior 
training, the U.S. Army has its forces stationed throughout the continental United States 
as well as forward deployed around the world in such countries as South Korea, 
Germany, Italy, and Kuwait.  In order to understand the full scope of the U.S. Army’s 
capabilities, Table 8 outlines its current assets.   
Table 8.   U.S. Army Armor, Artillery, Anti-Tank Weapons, Air Defense Weapons, 
Infantry Weapons, Aviation, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Missiles 
                                                 
106 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 2010: The annual 
assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics: Chapter One: North America (London: 
IISS, 2010), 19. 
107 “Quadrennial Defense Review Report” (delivered to the United States February 2010), xvi. 
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Role In Service 
U.S. Army Armor  
Main Battle Tank 6,467 (1) 
Armored Personnel Carrier 112 
Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle 6,700 
Armored Personnel Carrier 16,270 (2,3) 
Medium Armored Vehicle 1,700 
Protected Patrol Vehicle 239 
Armored HMMWV 500 
Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicle n/a 
U.S. Army Artillery  
Self-Propelled Artillery 975 
Towed Artillery 720 
Towed Howitzer 350 
Multiple Launch Rocket System 1,070 
High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System 52 
Lightweight Mortar n/a 
Mortar n/a 
U.S. Army Anti-Tank Weapons  
Light Anti-Tank Weapon n/a 
Anti-Tank Guided Weapon 8,600 + 330 
Anti-Tank Weapon n/a 
U.S. Army Air Defense Weapons  
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Surface-to-Air-Missile 1339 
Close In Weapon System 2 
U.S. Army Infantry Weapons  
9 mm Berretta 92F (M9) Pistol 
9 mm Berretta (M10) Pistol 
9 mm Colt Pistol 
9 mm H&K MP5 Sub-Machine Gun 
5.56 mm H&K 416 Carbine 
5.56 mm M16A2 Rifle 
5.56 mm M4 Rifle 
7.62 mm M14 Rifle 
7.62 mm M14 Mod 0 (4) Enhanced Battle Rifle 
7.62 mm M24 Sniper Rifle 
5.56 mm M249 SAW Light Machine Gun 
7.62 mm M240B Machine Gun 
0.50 Browning M2HB` Machine Gun (5) 
40 mm MK79 Support Weapon 
40 mm M203 Support Weapon 
40 mm Mk19 Mod 3 Support Weapon 
SMAW Support Weapon 
MK47 Support Weapon 
40 mm M-32 (6) Grenade Launcher 
MK19  Grenade Machine Gun 
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60 mm M224 Mortar 
81 mm M252 Mortar 
107 mm M30 Mortar 
120 mm M-120/121 Mortar 
U.S. Army Aviation  
Helicopter – Utility 1632 
Helicopter – Attack 1064 
Electronic Intelligence 54 (7) 
Helicopter – Special Operations 271 (8) 
Helicopter – Observation 264 
Transport 2 
Helicopter – Transport 437 
Transport 152 
Utility 47 (9) 
Helicopter – Medevac 76 
Helicopter – Multirole 41 
Helicopter – Signals Intelligence 60 
Trainer 11 (7) 
Test 3 
Helicopter - Trainer 195 (10) 
U.S. Army Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  
Hunter (11)  





Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
n/a 
MQ-1C Gray Eagle Multirole n/a 












Dragon Eye (12) 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
n/a 
U.S. Army Missiles  
FIM-92 Stinger Air-to-Air 
BGM-71 TOW Anti-Armor 
AGM-114 Hellfire Anti-Armor 
AGM-114 Hellfire 2 Anti-Armor 
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Notes: Armor-1. The M1 production is complete; no longer in service with a 
total of 2,374 units.  2. This is the number of M113s produced for the US.  The total 
number produces is 74,296.  3. The in-service estimate for M113s includes many 
variants and 4, 650 M577 command posts.  Anti-Tank Weapons-The 8,600 TOW 
ATGW includes 1,380 on HMMWV, 520 on M-901 and over 6,00 on M2 Bradley.  Air 
Defense Weapons-Two land-based Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS) have 
been deployed on low-loader trailers and are operational at Camp Anacond near Balad, 
Iraq.  Infantry Weapons-4. The M14 Mod 0 with a shorter 18 inch barrel has been 
issued to Navy Seals.  5. Probably some still in sue but being phased out.  6. Introduced 
to Regimental Combat Team 5, based in Camp Falluhah, the M-32 six-shot 40mm 
grenade launcher.  Aviation-7. Operated with civil registrations and colour schemes; 
previously designated RC-7B.  8. Includes some MH-6Js.   9. Some remain in service 
for testing; being retired and replaced with UH-72As.  10. Operated on contract basis 
with civil registrations.  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles-11.  RQ-5 family of systems 
including Hunter II.  12. Operated by the U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM). 
Source: Adapted by Brenna Schnars from Jane’s Online, “Army, United States,” Jane’s 
Sentinel Security Assessment- North America. 
2. Air Force 
While the U.S. Air Force’s concentration is not specifically centered around 
waterways and naval bases, the severity of conflict that could ensue if Iran closed the 
Strait of Hormuz cannot be fully determined; thus, it is appropriate to highlight the air 
force’s capabilities.  The United States Air Force entertains a vision of Global Vigilance, 
Reach, and Power in order to fulfill its core capabilities of air and space superiority, 
global attack, rapid global mobility, information superiority, and agile combat support 
and is comprised of 334,342 personnel along with 238,000 reservists, divided into 10 
Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF) with 10,000–15,000 personnel in each.108  It has 
the equipment and capability to conduct operations with combat aircraft, multirole 
fighters, interceptors, ground attack assets, transports, reconnaissance/airborne early 
warning vehicles, helicopters, tilt-rotors, and unmanned aerial vehicles.  Several 
components make up the U.S. Air Force, including the Air Combat Command (ACC), the 
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Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), the Air Education and Training Command 
(AETC), the Air Force Material Command (AFMC), the Air Force Space Command 
(AFSPC), the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and the Air Mobility 
Command (AMC).  Each command is responsible for a specific mission set among the 
entire air force which range from training, supporting, and directing U.S. land-based 
missions, to directing and implementing nuclear capable missions, and providing a 
forward presence throughout the international community.   
Along with its extensive mission set, the U.S. Air Force is the most effective fighting 
air force throughout the world due in part to the strategic location of its bases which are located 
in several states across the United States as well as overseas in Japan, South Korea, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom and Turkey.  The vigorous and continual training process 
for air force personnel both in the classroom and in the air ensure that U.S. Air Force personnel 
have the opportunity to acquire a multitude of flying hours throughout their careers, as well as 
access to the most up-to-date and technological advances of any air force throughout the world.  
While the U.S. Air Force is undoubtedly the world’s most capable and effective air force, the 
United States wants to continue this trend and fiscal years 2011 through 2015 will bring with 
them eight ISR wing-equivalents (with up to 380 primary mission aircraft), 30–32 airlift and 
aerial refueling wing-equivalents (with 33 primary mission aircraft per wing-equivalent), 10–11 
theater strike wing-equivalents (with 72 primary mission aircraft per wing-equivalent), five 
long-range strike (bomber) wings (with up to 96 primary mission aircraft), six air superiority 
wing-equivalents (with 72 primary mission aircraft per wing-equivalent), three command 
control wings and five fully-operational air and space operations centers (with a total of 27 
primary mission aircraft), and 10 space and cyberspace wings.109  In order to understand the 
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Table 9.   U.S. Air Force Fixed Wing Aircraft, Rotary Wing Aircraft, Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles, Missiles 
Role In Service 
U.S. Air Force Fixed Wing Aircraft  
Bomber 161 
Fighter – Multirole 2.024 (1) 
Fighter - Ground Attack / Strike 355 
Airborne Laser Platform 1 
Airborne Early Warning and Control 32 
Intelligence / Reconnaissance / Surveillance 30 
Reconnaissance / Surveillance 58 
Electronic Intelligence 22 
Command and Control 4 
Transport 753 (1,2) 
Tanker / Transport 476 
VIP / Transport 39 
Utility 115 (3) 
Special Operations 139 
Trainer 981 (3) 
Test 2 
Motor Glider 40 (3) 
Electronic Trials and Research 1 
Weather Reconnaissance 11 
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U.S. Air Force Rotary Wing Aircraft  
Special Operations 70 (4) 
Search and Rescue 99 
Trainer 27 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles  
Multirole 156 
Aerial Target 80 (5) 
U.S. Air Force Missiles  
LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBM (6) Strategic 
AGM-86B ALCM (7) Strategic 
AGM-129A ACM (7) Strategic 
AIM-7M/P Sparrow Air-to-Air 
AIM-9L/M Sidewinder Air-to-Air 
AIM-9X Sidewinder Air-to-Air 
AIM-120A/B/C/D AMRAAM Air-to-Air 
AGM-65A/B/D/E/G/H/K Maverick Air-to-Surface 
AGM-86C/D CALCM Air-to-Surface 
AGM-88A/B/C HARM Air-to-Surface 
AGM-130A Air-to-Surface 
AGM-130C Air-to-Surface 
AGM-158A JASSM Air-to-Surface 
AGM-154A JSOW Air-to-Surface 
AGM-142 Popeye Air-to-Surface 
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AGM-84D Harpoon Anti-Ship Attack 
Notes: Fixed Wing Aircraft-Figures quoted include aircraft assigned to first-
line and second-line forces, as well as in-service reserves and those undergoing 
maintenance; aircraft in long-term storage are not included. 1.  Deliveries in progress.  
2. Owned by National Science Foundation and operated by USAF ANG on their behalf.  
3. Operated in civilian markings.  Rotary Wing Aircraft-4. Delivery in progress.  One 
lost in a crash in Afghanistan in April 2010.  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles-5. QF-4 
Phantom used as full-size aerial target; figure quoted is for total estimated requirement 
(excluding pre-production aircraft) during programme lifetime; QF-4E and QRF-4C 
versions currently in use, with QF-4G versions all expended.  Missiles-6. Total of 450 
missiles presently emplaced in silos.  7. Total procurement; quantity in service reduced, 
with all AGM-129As due to be retired, leaving about 528 AGM-86Bs in operational 
inventory. 
Source:  Adapted by Brenna Schnars from Jane’s Online, “World air forces, United 
States,” Jane’s World Air Forces. 
3. Navy 
As has been mentioned previously, if Iran were to close the Strait of Hormuz, the 
United States Navy would be the primary fighting force at the onset of the military 
mission to reopen the Strait.  The United States Navy consists of 329,092 active duty and 
109,241 reserve personnel of which approximately 45,000 are routinely deployed 
throughout the world in order to carry out the U.S. Navy’s role as a continuous, 
adaptable, and active instrument of security policy designed to promote stability and 
project military power. It comprises two fleet areas, the Atlantic and Pacific, and is 
further divided into six fleets: the Atlantic, the Pacific, the Caribbean, Central, and South 
American, the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea, the Mediterranean, and the West  
Pacific.110  The U.S. Navy is equipped with both sea and air assets as well as special 
forces.  U.S. Navy ships, including aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, cruisers, 
destroyers, and submarines are regularly deployed throughout the world and their 
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presence is always known by the international community.  Mine countermeasure ships 
are also among the U.S. Navy’s arsenal and would be of particular importance if Iran 
were to close the Strait of Hormuz along with the navy’s strategic SSBNs and tactical 
SSNs and SSGNs.  It is also equipped with logistics and support elements, such as oilers, 
which give it the ability to self-sustain during six month to year-long deployments 
throughout the international waters of the world.  U.S. Naval Aviation personnel are 
divided into squadrons and are part of one of the navy’s 11 air wings; each possesses 
F/A-18s, SH-60s, EA-6Bs, and E-2Cs along with a multitude of conventional, laser-
guided, and GPS guided bombs.   
Similar to the United States Army and Air Force, training for Navy personnel is 
of superior caliber and takes places both in the classroom, in the air, and at sea and 
encompasses a wide range of military exercises both in and off the coast of the United 
States as well as in international waters such as the Mediterranean.  The U.S. Navy is 
known for its forward presence throughout the world while it conducts regular 
deployments but it also has forward operating bases and support activities in Japan, 
Spain, Greece, Guam, and Italy.  The U.S. Navy also consists of special operations 
forces, organized into eight SEAL teams with two SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) teams 
along with Special Boat Teams who are trained in superior tactics that can be employed 
during wartime operations.   
The strategic vision for the U.S. Navy throughout fiscal years 2011–2015, as 
defined in the QDR, is to continue to be the world’s leading navy and will include 10–11 
aircraft carriers and 10 carrier air wings, 84–88 large surface combatants, including 21–
32 ballistic missile defense-capable combatants and Aegis Ashore, 14–28 small surface 
combatants (+14 mine countermeasure ships), 29–31 amphibious warfare ships, 53–55 
attack submarines and 4 guided missile submarines, 126–171 land-based intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare (EW) aircraft (manned and 
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unmanned), 3 maritime prepositioning squadrons, 30-33 combat logistics force ships (+1 
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP)), 17–25 command and support vessels (including Joint 
High Speed Vessels, three T-AKE Class dry cargo/ammunition ships, one mobile landing 
platform), and 51 roll-on/roll-off strategic sealift vessels.111  While this is the goal for the 
future of the U.S. Navy, Table 10 outlines the current inventory of its offensive assets but 
excludes support elements. 
Table 10.   U.S. Navy Submarines, Surface Fleet, Amphibious Forces, Mine Warfare 
Forces, Patrol Forces, Special Mission Ships, Aviation, Missiles   
Role In Service 
U.S. Navy Submarines  
Los Angeles–Attack, Nuclear Powered 53 
Ohio–Cruise Missile, Nuclear Powered 4 (1) 
Ohio–Strategic Missile, Nuclear Powered 14 
U.S. Navy Surface Fleet  
Aircraft Carrier 10 
Command Ship 2 
Cruiser–Guided Missile (Aegis) 22 
Destroyer–Guided Missile (Aegis/Flight IIA) 30 
Destroyer–Guided Missile (Aegis/Flights I and II) 28 
Frigate–Guided Missile 30 
Littoral Combat Ship 3 
U.S. Navy Amphibious Forces  
Amphibious Assault Ship 10 
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Amphibious Transport Dock 11 
Landing Ship–Dock 3 
Landing Ship–Dock(MPF Type) 9 
Landing Craft 10 
Landing Craft Air Cushion 80 
Landing Craft–Mechanised 35 
Landing Craft–Personnel 75 
Landing Craft–Utility 67 
Logistic Support Vessel 8 
Landing Craft–Mechanised  39 
Unmanned Surface Vehicle  1 
U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Forces  
Mine Countermeasures 14 
U.S. Navy Patrol Forces  
Patrol Boat 116 
Patrol Craft 886 
Patrol Craft–Coastal 8 (2) 
Patrol Craft–Fast 20 
Patrol Craft–River 20 
Rigid Inflatable Boat 80 
 
U.S. Navy Special Mission Ships  
Command Ship 2 
Acoustic Survey Ship 1 
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Cable Repairing Ship 1 
Missile Range Instrumentation Ship 2 
Test Support Ship 1 
Ocean Surveillance Ship 5 
Survey Ship 7 
U.S. Navy Aviation  
Fighter–Multirole 670 (3,4) 
Helicopter–Maritime / Anti-Submarine 206 
Maritime / Anti-Submarine 161 (5) 
Helicopter–Multirole 115 
Reconnaissance / Surveillance 2 (6) 
Telemetry 1(7) 
Airborne Early Warning and Control 70 
Command and Control 16 
Transport 79 
Assault Transport 32 
Electronic Warfare 129 (8) 
Search and Rescue 38 
Special Operations 27 
Trainer 150 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 7 
Multirole 5 
U.S. Naval Aviation-Missiles  
AIM-9L Sidewinder Air-to-Air 
AIM-9M Sidewinder Air-to-Air 
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AIM-9X Sidewinder Air-to-Air 
AIM-120A AMRAAM Air-to-Air 
AIM-120B AMRAAM Air-to-Air 
AIM-120C AMRAAM Air-to-Air 
AGM-65F Maverick Air-to-Surface 
AGM-84E SLAM Air-to-Surface 
AGM-84H SLAM-ER Air-to-Surface 
AGM-88A HARM Air-to-Surface 
AGM-88B HARM Air-to-Surface 
AGM-88C HARM Air-to-Surface 
AGM-88D HARM Air-to-Surface 
AGM-122A Sidearm Air-to-Surface 
AGM-123A Skipper 2 Air-to-Surface 
AGM-84A Harpoon Anti-Ship Attack 
AGM-119B Penguin Anti-Ship Attack 
ADM-141 TALD Decoy 
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Notes: Submarines-1. Four Ohio SSBNs have been converted to SSGN with 
Tomahawk and the ability to operate SEAL forces.  Mine Warfare Forces-There are no 
surface minelayers. Mining is undertaken by carrier-based aircraft, land-based aircraft 
and submarines. The USN decommissioned all remaining Osprey-class coastal 
minehunters in February 2008.  Patrol Forces-2. Five craft are on loan to the Coast 
Guard.  Aviation-3. A total of 104 USN and USMC Hornets of unknown variants were 
grounded in March 2010 due to airframe cracks.   4. A total of 515 F/A-18E/F Super 
Hornets planned through 2011.  5. Of 161 total aircraft, 39 were grounded in 2007 due 
to structural fatigue problems.  Eleven more reported grounded in 2009.  Repairs are 
likely to take two years.  6. All have been retired from fleet service, but three S-3Bs are 
being refurbished to remain in a support role providing range surveillance at the Naval 
Air Warfare Center Weapons Division.  7. Returned to service in 2010 following three 
year repair programme.  8.There are 57 on order from a total requirement of 90.  
Source: Adapted by Brenna Schnars from Jane’s Online, “Navy, United States,” Jane’s 
Sentinel Security Assessment-North America. 
4. Marine Corps 
While the United States Navy has sea and air assets, the United States Marine 
Corps can also be considered a U.S. Navy asset because naval amphibious ships have the 
ability to transport the marines along with their equipment into hostile or potentially 
hostile territory.  Marines make regular deployments with Navy Expeditionary Strike 
Groups (ESG) and the ships that carry them are specifically designed with the ability to 
move closer to the shore in shallower water depths in order to assist the Marines in 
making their way to the beach.  As Marines are part of these regularly scheduled naval 
deployments, they would be a valuable asset in combating Iran if it closed the Strait of 
Hormuz.   
The United States Marine Corps is composed of 204,261 personnel divided into 
three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), three Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB), 
and seven Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) which includes a battalion landing team, 
an aviation combat element, and a composite logistics battalion which have the ability to 
fly F/A-18 A/B/C/D, AV-8B, EA-6B, and F-5E fighter aircraft, AH-1W/Z, UH-1N/Y, 
CH-46E, CH-53D/E rotary-wing aircraft, tanker and transport aircraft, and the MV-22 
tilt-rotor aircraft along with employing its ground forces consisting of M1-A1 Abrams 
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tanks, Light Armored Vehicles (LAV) and Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV).112  
Similar to the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps also has special operations battalions 
who enhance the Marine Corps’ ability to maintain the highest state of readiness whether 
inside the continental United States or abroad.  This is due in part to the demanding 
training regime that all Marine Corps personnel must complete both in the field, air, and 
classroom, depending on each members specialty.   
The Marine Corps’ rigorous training program coupled with its forward operation 
presence in Okinawa, Japan and in the coming years in Guam assists in its ability to be an 
effective fighting force with the ability to respond quickly to conflicts throughout the 
international community.  The Marine Corps conducts training exercises on a regular 
basis and its most recent one, “Cobra Gold 2010” displayed its capability to effectively 
and efficiently carry out an amphibious assault.  These type of exercises are crucial to the 
success of the Marine Corps not only from a training perspective but also because 
exercises such as this, which was conducted in Thailand, are a show of force to the 
international community of just how capable the United States Marine Corps fighting 
force is.    
Retention among the Marine Corps is also fairing well compared to other U.S. 
military forces which increases its sustainability and effectiveness.  Due to high retention 
rates and increased responsibility in the future, the QDR of 2010 calls for a total force of 
three Marine expeditionary forces, four Marine divisions (3 AC and 1 RC), 11 infantry 
regiments, four artillery regiments, four Marine aircraft wings (6 fixed-wing groups, 7 
rotary-wing groups, 4 control groups, 4 support groups), four Marine logistics groups (9 
combat logistics regiments), and seven Marine expeditionary unit command elements 
between fiscal years 2011 and 2015.113  While these components are the goal over the 
next five years, Table 11 outlines the current assets of the United States Marine Corps. 
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Table 11.    USMC Armor, Artillery, Anti-Tank Weapons, Air Defense Weapons, 
Infantry Weapons, Aviation, Missiles 
Role In Service 
USMC Armor  
Main Battle Tank 403 
Armored Personnel Carrier 589 (1) 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle 1,321 
USMC Artillery  
High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems Launchers 38 
Towed Howitzer 697 
Self-Propelled Mortar 50 (2) 
Mortar 536 
USMC Anti-TankWeapons  
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Weapon System 95 (3) 
Heavy Anti-Tank Weapon System 1,083 
Medium Anti-Armor Missile System 1,500 
Light Anti-Tank Weapon 1,300 
Short-Range Assault Weapon - Multiple Purpose 1,038 (4) 
USMC Air Defense Weapons  
Man-Portable Surface-to-Air Missile 2,000 
Self-Propelled Air Defense System 267 (5,6) 




USMC Infantry Weapons  
9 mm M9 Pistol 
0.45 MEU (SOC) Pistol 
9 mm MP-5N Sub-Machine Gun 
5.56 mm M16A2 Rifle 
7.62 mm M14 (7) Rifle 
7.62 mm Designated Marksman Rifle (DMR) Sniper Rifle 
7.62 mm M40A1 Sniper Rifle 
5.56 mm M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) Light Machine Gun 
7.62 mm M60E3 Light Machine Gun 
7.62 mm M240G (8) General Purpose Machine Gun 
0.50 Browning M2 Heavy Machine Gun 
40 mm M203 Grenade Launcher 
40 mm MK19 Mod 3 Grenade Machine Gun 
60 mm M224 Lightweight Company Mortar 
12 Gauge Joint Service Combat Shotgun Shotgun 
USMC Aviation  
Fighter – Multirole 145 (9) 
Fighter - Ground Attack / Strike 229 (9) 
Attack 179 
Transport 4 
Tanker / Transport 94 
Utility 474 
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Utility Tiltrotor 116 (10) 
Trainer 20 
Trainer 57 
USMC Aviation-Missiles  
AIM-9L Sidewinder Air-to-Air 
AIM-9M Sidewinder Air-to-Air 
AIM-120A AMRAAM Air-to-Air 
AIM-120B AMRAAM Air-to-Air 
AIM-120C AMRAAM Air-to-Air 
AGM-65E Maverick Air-to-Surface 
AGM-65J Maverick Air-to-Surface 
AGM-88 HARM Air-to-Surface 
AGM-122A Sidearm Air-to-Surface 
BGM-71 TOW Anti-Armor 
AGM-114B Hellfire Anti-Armor 
ADM-141 TALD Decoy 
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Notes: Armor-1. Includes 46 LAV(R) recovery, 94 LAV(L) logistics support 
and 50 LAV(C) command and control variants, but not the LAV(M) mortar and 
LAV(AT) variants, which are listed under the artillery and anti-tank inventories 
respectively.  Arillery-2. Mortar variant of LAV-25 armed with M252 81 mm mortar 
instead of 25 mm cannon.  Anti-Tank Weapons-3. Anti-tank variant of LAV-25 armed 
with twin TOW launchers instead of 25 mm cannon.   4. This figure includes 120 
launchers and 1,038 missiles.  Air Defense Weapons-5. The Avenger is a High 
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) armed with eight Stinger missiles 
and a 12.7 mm machine gun.  6. The air defense variant of the LAV-25, the LAV(AD) 
is armed with eight Stinger missiles and a 25mm GAU-12 cannon.  Infantry Weapons-
7. Used primarily for drill and ceremonial purposes.  8. The M240G is the USMC’s 
designation for the FN MAG.  Aviation-9. A total of 104 USN and USMC Hornets of 
unknown variants were grounded in March 2010 due to airframe cracks.   10. Total 
includes about 10 with navy test establishments 
Source: Adapted by Brenna Schnars from Jane’s Online, “Marine Corps, United States,” 
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment-North America. 
D. GCC STATES 
If Iran were to close the Strait of Hormuz it would significantly affect the 
economies of the majority of GCC states.  While all of the GCC states oppose military 
action against Iran, if Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, the United States would have no 
choice but to combat such an action, which could ultimately lead to Iranian attacks on a 
number of the GCC states.  In order to assess the military effectiveness of the GCC states, 
the following sections will provide information on the military strength and capabilities 
of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman.  Following these 
summaries, Table 12 will provide the total army, air force, and navy assets of the GCC 
states combined as the majority of these countries are small compared to Iran thus a 
combined effort would be in order. 
1. Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabian military forces are composed of 233,500 active duty personnel, of 
which 75,000 are in the army, 13,500 in the navy, 20,000 in the Saudi air force, 16,000 in 
air defense, 9,000 in the industrial security force, and 100,000 in the national guard, as 
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well as an additional paramilitary force of 15,500 personnel.114  Since the downfall of 
Saddam Hussein, the Saudi military forces have shifted more toward maintaining security 
within their own borders vice combating outside aggressors.  Its military does monitor its 
borders and still maintains bases close to these areas in order to combat potential 
neighboring antagonists.   
The Saudi Army, also known as the Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF) are not the 
only ground forces within its military and have their own internal conflicts with the Saudi 
Arabian National Guard (SANG).  This fact aside, the RSLF is significant in size; with 
five infantry brigades, three armor brigades, eight artillery battalions, and one airborne 
brigade however, the vast amount of territory owned by Saudi Arabia is a challenging 
endeavor for its army personnel to effectively and efficiently protect.  Conscription is not 
practiced in Saudi Arabia thus its numbers of volunteers is dismal, specifically in the 
army but its members receive focused long term training especially its officer corps.  It 
has bases in several locations throughout its territory, including Riyadh, Hafr al-Batin, 
Tabuk, Dhahran, and Jeddah and has participated in joint exercises with other GCC 
states.   
The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) may be the most prestigious military entity of 
the country and receives a vast amount of funding for training purposes and equipment.  
The goal of the air force is two-fold: defending the country from foreign aggressors and 
protecting the countries oil platforms, which it does alongside the Royal Saudi Air 
Defense Force (RSADF).  The Saudi air forces are able to patrol the vast amount of air 
space owned its country due in part to its multitude of air bases in Riyadh, Tabuk, al-
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a significant amount of assets in its arsenal, including combat and transport aircraft and 
missiles and has participated in joint exercises not only among the GCC states in “Gulf 
Spears” but the United States as well.115 
The Royal Saudi Navy (RSN) is composed of 15,000 personnel but also includes 
a 3,000 personnel Marine force.  Although this component of the Saudi military receives 
the least amount of funding, Saudi Arabia has been making advancements that would 
assist in combating Iranian submarines in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, protect 
its oil platforms, and combat aggressors in the Red Sea.  Due to it territory being 
surrounded by both the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia has naval bases on 
both coast in As-Sharmah, Duba, al-Wajih, Yanbu al-Bahr, Jeddah, Jizan, al-Qanif, Ras 
Tannurah, al-Jubayl, al-Dammam, ras al-Mishab, and Haqi.  Among its arsenal of 
equipment, the RSN owns seven frigates, four corvettes, and seven mine warfare vessels, 
however, the majority of Saudi naval assets are extremely old and if it wants to 
effectively patrol and defend its coastline, significant upgrades are in order.   
2. Bahrain 
The Bahraini army is composed of 8,500 personnel, divided into three infantry 
battalions, three armor battalions, and one artillery group, which could solely and 
effectively defend it national sovereignty, if invaded, for up to 48 hours.116  While many 
world navies focus on offensive capabilities, Bahrain is more of a defensive army, and all 
of its personnel are located in the capital, Manama.  Although a fairly small force, with 
mediocre training, with the exception being joint training with GCC states, it is still able 
to possess a significant amount of equipment including reconnaissance vehicles, armored 
personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, howitzers, surface to air missiles, and a 
small array of handheld infantry weapons.   
                                                 









The Royal Bahraini Air Force is composed of 1,500 personnel and possesses both 
fixed and rotary wing combat aircraft, including the F-16C/D, the F-5E/F, the AH-1E, 
and the S-70A.117  It has two bases; one in Shaikh Isa and the other located in Riffa, and 
it is considered an effective defensive force among world air forces, although it only has 
three fighter squadrons and four helicopter squadrons.  Bahrain must rely on its GCC 
neighbors in order to train its air force personnel and also cooperates with the GCC in 
training exercises such as “Gulf Spears” mentioned previously.   
The Royal Bahraini Navy consists of approximately 700 personnel and maintains 
a frigate, corvettes, patrol and coastal combatants, and amphibious craft in its arsenal.118  
Bahrain lacks mine warfare capabilities but is an effective fighting force against 
smuggling, for a minimal amount of time, as well as protecting fishery.  Its sole naval 
base is located at Mina Sulman and it relies on the Royal Navy as well as the GCC states 
for training purposes.  Of significant importance to Bahrain is its sole former U.S. Navy 
frigate, which it has possessed since 1997.  Bahrain’s naval force is significantly small 
compared to other world navies, however, it is a great ally to the United States. 
3. Kuwait 
The Kuwaiti Army is comprised of 11,000 personnel, divided into 2–3 infantry 
brigades, three armor brigades, and one artillery brigade.119  The primary mission for the 
army is to protect and defend its borders and similar to Bahrain, it would only be able to 
do so effectively for a short period of time before its allies would need to intervene.  Its 
main headquarters is located in Kuwait City but it also has forces in bases to the south, 
north and west of its capital.  It is equipped with battle tanks, reconnaissance vehicles, 
armored personnel carriers, howitzers, mortars, anti-tank guided missiles, and an arsenal  
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of handheld infantry weapons and has conducted training exercises with the United 
States.  While Kuwait has the United States as an ally, it is making progress to enhance 
and update its arsenal of army equipment. 
The Kuwaiti Air Force’s strength numbers 2,500 personnel and it possess fixed-
wing combat aircraft including the F-18, rotary wing combat aircraft, the AH-64d and SA 
342L, and transport aircraft, including the L-100-30.120  It has been rebuilding its forces 
since the invasion by Iraq and is a strong fighting force considering its size.  Along with 
its mission of air defense, the army also provides support to its land forces once deployed 
from one of three bases located in either Ahmed al-Jaber, Ali al-Salem, or from the 
Kuwait International Airport.  Kuwait cooperates not only in training, as it receives 
support from the United States, but also among its GCC counterparts, as it participated in 
the GCC joint exercise “Gulf Spears” in November 2009. 
The Kuwaiti Navy is composed of 2,700 personnel, of which 500 serve in the 
Kuwaiti Coast Guard, and it owns mainly missile craft used for coastal defense and 
customs support.121  While the navy’s main goal is to maintain its independence, it has a 
joint agreement with Iraq concerning smuggling in the Persian Gulf.  Its primary naval 
base is located in Ras al-Qalaya, while its multiple coast guard bases are in Shuwaikh, 
Umm al-Hainan, and al-Bida.  The training program has significantly increased since the 
Iraqi invasion mainly due in part to the United States’ and United Kingdom’s assistance.  
Training has improved via the help of its allies, however, Kuwait is moving forward in 
advancing its naval forces through major overhauls of outdated equipment and possible 
future purchases.   
                                                 










Qatar’s Army is comprised of 8500 personnel who are divided among four 
mechanized infantry battalions, one armor battalion, one artillery battalion, one air 
defense battery, one special forces company, and three Royal Guard infantry 
regiments.122  While Qatar has a relatively smaller population, its army is a very capable 
force, specifically against terrorist attacks in part due to its training by Western and other 
Middle East allies.  Its primary army post is located in the capital, Doha but its forces 
regularly patrol Dukhan and Umm Bab.  Along with being trained by its allies, the Qatari 
army has also participated in joint exercises with fellow GCC states as well as the United 
States. 
The Qatar Emiri Air Force’s (QEAF) personnel strength measures 2100 and 
among its arsenal of equipment is the Mirage 2000-3EDA combat aircraft, the SA 342L 
Gazelle and WS.61 Commando Mk 3 combat helicopters, as well as the C-17A 
Globemaster III transport vehicle.123  It has two air bases located at al-Udeid and Doha 
International Airport (IAP) and receives training from its British allies.  It also 
participates in joint exercises, specifically with its GCC counterparts.  While the QEAF 
has a few assets, it has been negotiating with India to sell is combat aircraft and its 
helicopters are in need of refurbishment. 
Qatar’s naval force is comprised of 1800 personnel, which includes Marine Police 
and possess 21 patrol and coastal combatants along with one amphibious craft.124  Its 
capabilities include patrolling its coastal waterway, although only for short periods of 
time, anti-smuggling, and anti-piracy missions, and its primary goal is to maintain the 
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sovereignty of its country.  Its operates out of its two naval bases located in Doha and 
Halul Island and conducts training with other GCC states while being trained at home as 
well as in France and the UK.  While the majority of its naval assets are decades old, it 
continues to refurbish its antiquated equipment in order to continue to effectively 
complete its missions.   
5. UAE 
UAE’s army consists of 59,000 personnel, which includes 15,000 Dubai forces, 
and is divided into three integrated mechanized infantry brigades, two integrated infantry 
brigades, an integrated Royal Guards brigade, two non-integrated (Dubai) infantry 
brigades, two armor brigades, an artillery brigade, and a battlefield air defense brigade.125  
While its mission is to protect its territory, it would only be able to do so for a short 
period of time and would need its allies to intercept in order to fend off agressors.  It has 
several bases throughout the country and receives training from the United States and 
France.  The UAE army, while its current stockpile is sufficient, is known to be procuring 
additional assets from a variety of other countries in order to increase its effectiveness.  
The United Arab Emirates Air Force and Air Defense (UAE AF and AD) has a 
total of 4000 personnel, along with an additional 500 personnel police air wing, and 
possesses the Mirage 2000-9 and F-16 Desert Falcon combat aircraft along with the C-
130H Hercules transport.126  Similar to its GCC counterparts, its air force is a capable 
defending force but only for short period of time thus it relies on heavily on its allies not 
only for training but also for assistance in conflicts.  One significant mission of the UAE 
AF and AD is the protection of its oil platforms, which it is better able to protect due to 
its multitude of bases throughout Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah.  It has taken part in 
several joint exercises, including “Gulf Spears” alongside other GCC states as well as 
                                                 









exercises with US, French, and UK air forces.  Over the past five years, the UAE has 
received significant upgrades to its air equipment and it appears that it is going to 
continue with this trend in equipment procurement. 
The UAE’s Navy has approximately 2,500 members and has four principal 
surface combatants, 14 patrol and coastal combatants, mine warfare and mine 
countermeasures ships, 28 amphibious craft, and logistic and support elements.127  The 
primary mission of its navy it to defend it territorial coastal areas but in the future, the 
UAE is looking to become a more offensive and blue water force.  It has naval bases in 
Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah, and Sharjah and conducts training exercises mainly 
in its own coastal territory with assistance from the UK, France, and the Netherlands.  
The UAE is striving to become a more effective and offensive naval force and along with 
this desire, it will have to purchase or manufacture more equipment, such as submarines, 
in order to do so.   
6. Oman 
The Royal Army of Oman (RAO) consists of 31,400 personnel, which includes 
6400 Royal Household troops divided among eight infantry battalions, two armor 
regiments, three artillery regiments, and an air defense regiment.128  Its primary mission 
is to protect Oman’s sovereignty and it is able to complete this for a short period of time 
without ally intervention.  It has several army posts throughout the country in Muscat, 
Khasab, Muaskar al-Murtafa, Musandam, Seeb, and Salalah, in which the majority of 
training is held for its personnel.  Some of its members receive training in and from the 
United States and the UK, and their forces also complete training exercises with other 
GCC countries. 
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The Royal Air Force of Oman (RAFO) is composed of 5,000 personnel and 
maintains a multitude of aircraft including the F-16 combat aircraft and the C-130H 
transport.129  Its mission is to provide air defense for Omani territory and it also assists 
the army in close air support.  Its bases are located in Muscat, al-Masirah, al-Musana’a, 
Khasab, Seeb, Salalah, and Thumrait.  The RAFO has a relatively intense training 
program for its student both in the air and in the classroom, which translates to effective 
training exercises with other GCC states, India, and the UK. 
The Royal Navy of Oman (RNO) has two corvettes, four fast attack craft, eight 
patrol craft, and six landing craft that its 4,200 personnel operate.130  As with several of 
the GCC states, Oman also lacks significant mine warfare capabilities but it is successful 
in patrolling its shores and coastal defense.  With its bases in Musandam, Salalah, and 
Wudam, it is able to deploy for short periods of time in order to patrol its territorial seas 
and assist in search and rescue when needed.  The RNO relies heavily on its allies for 
training, specifically the UK.  With its small force size, Oman would only be able to 
defend itself for a brief period of time before it would need ally assistance to deter 
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Table 12.   GCC States Army, Air Force, and Navy Assets 
Role In Service 
ARMY  
Armor  
Main Battle Tank 1262 (1,2,3) 
Reconnaissance Vehicle 374 (4,5) 
Armored Personnel Carrier 1269 (6,7) 
Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle 1194 
Light Armored Vehicle 20 
NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle 27 
Armored Command Post Vehicle 40 
Infantry Combat Vehicle 73 
Armored Combat Vehicle 136 
Light Tank 76 
Mine-protected Armored Personnel Carrier 48 
Armored Personnel Carrier (Amphibious) 24 
High Mobility Tactical Vehicle 500 
Armored Recovery Vehicle 4 
Artillery  
Self-Propelled Howitzer 439 (8) 
Howitzer (Towed) 142 
Multiple Rocket Launcher 135 
Mortar 442 (9) 
Self-Propelled Mortar 220 
Tactical Missile System 30 
Towed Gun / Howitzer 10 
Multiple Rocket System 12 
Self-Propelled Gun 64 
Gun/Field Gun 148 
Self-Propelled Gun-Howitzer 102 
Howitzer 30 
Anti-Tank Weapons  
Anti-Tank Guided Missile/Weapon 2732 (10,11) 
Light Anti-Tank Weapon 250 
Recoilless Rifle 848 
Anti-Tank Rocket 100 
Self-Propelled TOW Vehicle 8 
Anti-Tank Vehicle 66 
Rocket Propelled Grenade 100 
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Air Defense Weapons  
Man-Portable Surface-to-Air Missile 1226 
AMX-30 Self-Propelled Acquisition Unit 36 
AMX-30 Self-Propelled Firing Unit 73 
Shelter-Mounted Acquisition Unit 10 
Shelter-Mounted Firing Unit 19 
Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun/(Twin) 95 
Low-to-Medium Altitude Surface-to-Air  
Missile 
6 
Low-Level Surface-to-Air Missile  10 (12) 
Anti-Aircraft Gun (Twin) 16 
Anti-Aircraft Gun 34 (13) 
Surface-to-Air Missile 12 
Radar Guided Anti-Aircraft Gun (Twin) 30 
Surface-to-Air Missile Twin Launchers (14) 40 
Light Anti-Aircraft Gun (Towed) 50 
Light Anti-Aircraft Gun (Self-Propelled) 42 
Light Anti-Aircraft Gun 20 
Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun 9 
Infantry Weapons Role 
Pistol Assault Rifle 
Sub-Machine Gun Sniper Rifle 
Light Machine Gun Heavy Machine Gun 
General-Purpose Machine Gun Grenade Launcher 
Mortar General-Purpose Machine Gun 
Aviation In Service 
Helicopter–Attack 54 
Helicopter–Transport 12 
Helicopter–VIP Transport 1 
Helicopter–Medevac 8 
Helicopter–Observation 13 
AIR FORCE  
Fixed  Wing  
Fighter–Multirole 303 (15,16) 
Fighter–Interceptor / Air Defense 82 
Fighter–Ground Attack / Strike 69 
Airborne Early Warning and Control 5 
Reconnaissance / Surveillance 11 
Electronic Intelligence 2 
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Transport 75 (17) 
VIP / Transport 3 
Tanker / Transport 14 (18) 
Utility 23 
Trainer 268 (19,20) 
Fighter–Air Defense / Attack  8 
Trainer / Light Attack 20 
Maritime Patrol 4 (21) 
Communications 2 
Light Attack 11 
Rotary Wing  
Utility 121 (22, 23) 
Maritime / Anti-Submarine 13 
Attack 75 (24, 25) 
VIP / Transport 2 
Trainer 8 
Transport 9 
VIP Transport / Utility 4 (26) 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles  








Surface Fleet  




Patrol Ship/Craft/Patrol Craft Coastal 106 
Fast Attack Craft–Missile 29 
Fast Attack Craft–Gun 4 
Fast Landing Craft 2 
Landing Craft–Tank 4 
Landing Craft–Utility 6 
Landing Craft 20 
Landing Ship–Logistics 1 
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Submarines  
Swimmer Delivery Vehicle 10 
Auxiliaries  
Transport Craft/Ship 10 
Replenishment Ship 2 
Tug–Coastal 13 
Hydrofoil 1 
VIP Transport 3 
Rescue Vessel 2 
Diving Tender 1 
Supply Ship 2 
Landing Craft Utility 7 
Transport Craft–Personnel 1 
Landing Supply Craft 1 
Support Ship 2 
Logistic Support Craft 1 
Landing Craft–Tank 1 
Patrol Craft 4 
Utility Vessel 12 
Training Ship–Sail 1 
Naval Aviation  
Helicopter–Maritime / Anti-Submarine 27 (29) 
Helicopter–Search and Rescue 6 
Helicopter 12 
Utility 2 
Reconnaissance / Surveillance 4 
Naval Aviation Missiles  
Anti-Ship Attack  
Marine Police Fleet  
Fast Intercept Craft 4 
Patrol Craft–Coastal 10 
Coast Guard  
Patrol Boat 92 
Patrol Craft–Coastal 36 
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Notes: Armor-1.Approximately half of the M-84As are in storage.  2. Of these, 34 are in 
reserve.  3. Includes 46 armored recovery vehicles and two training vehicles.  4.  8 in 
reserve.  5. Includes six Stormer command post vehicles transferred from the UK in 1999.  
6. The Fahd APCs are in storage.  7. 31 Reported to be used for Internal Security in Oman. 
Artillery-8. 18 in storage.  9. Some self-propelled.  Anti-Tank Weapons- 10. Includes 224 
launchers mounted on Italian Oto Melara VCC-1 armored vehicles in Saudi Arabia.  11. 24 
Mounted on VAB APCs in Qatar.  Air Defense Weapons-12. This figure represents 3 
acquisition units.  13.  12 in reserve.  14. For Igla-1 missiles mounted on Nissan Patrol 
vehicles.  Fixed Wing- 15. Delivery in progress of 10 in Saudi Arabia. First 24 to come 
from UK production, with remainder to be assembled in Saudi Arabia.  16. Seven F-16E 
and seven F-16F retained in U.S. for training with the Arizona Air National Guard at 
Tucson.  17. Including three 'Seavans' engaged on maritime surveillance tasks; at least three 
other Skyvans in storage.  18. Quantity in service not known in the UAE; total of 12 
obtained from Libya, of which at least nine are being upgraded to CH-47C+ standard by 
AgustaWestland in Italy from 2006. Some are understood to have been operated for 
training before being subjected to upgrading.  19. Several grounded because of insufficient 
spares stocks in Kuwait. 20. 3 Possibly withdrawn from use in the UAE.  21. 4 in the UAE 
obtained second-hand from civilian market; two presently being fitted out with mission 
equipment.  Rotary Wing- 22. Total of 15 surviving SA 330 and IAR-330L helicopters 
were upgraded by IAR Brasov in Romania, 10 of which were transferred to Lebanon in 
2009.  23. Approximately half of Oman’s 15 presently held in storage at Al Musana'a 
awaiting sale.  24. Four have been transferred to Kuwaiti police.  25. Four Kuwaiti 
helicopters remain in USA for training duties.  26. Unconfirmed.  UAV-27. Each system 
comprises two UAVs for a total of 80 air vehicles.  Surface Fleet-28. Saudi Arabia’s 
Makkah was seriously damaged in a grounding incident in December 2004 and may not be 
repaired. Naval Aviation-29. Two of the UAE’s AS 535 are used for VIP transport. 
Source:  Adapted by Brenna Schnars from Jane’s Online, Jane’s World Armies, Air 









V. ASSESSEMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND THE CLOSING OF THE 
STRAIT OF HORMUZ 
A. IRAN’S CONTINUING NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND THE UNITED 
STATES AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
Beginning from the time of the Shah, Iran has continued to build upon its nuclear 
technologies.  While the United States, prior to the Islamic Revolution, had good 
relations with Iran and did not adamantly oppose nuclear ambitions inside Iran, Ayatollah 
Khomeini swiftly changed the U.S. and international perspective.  Lack of accurate 
reporting in nuclear advancements and the refusal of direct talks between Iran and the 
superpowers continues to make Iran’s nuclear program an unsettling one for the 
international community.  In April of 2010, President Obama warned Iran of increased 
sanctions if cooperation continued to remain at a standstill and his words came to fruition 
two months later.  On June 24, 2010, “The U.S. Senate voted 99–0…to pass a measure 
imposing new sanctions on Iran…a bill [that] would penalize financial institutions doing 
business with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp and any businesses involved with 
refined petroleum in the country.”131  These U.S. sanctions came less than three weeks 
after the new round of UN Security Council sanctions imposed on Iran on June 9, 2010, 
which targeted Iran’s powerful Revolutionary Guard, ballistic missiles, and nuclear-
related investments.132  These new rounds of sanctions imposed by the UN and 
specifically the United States directly correlates with international and U.S. ambitions to 
curb Iran’s continuing nuclear program.  While there are supporters and skeptics both in 
the United States and throughout the international community about how Iran will react 
in the near and far coming days, the United States believes that these sanctions will show 
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Iran that the international community, led in part by the United States, is not backing 
down from inflicting pressure upon Iran to halt its nuclear program.   
Israel is one of the greatest U.S. allies in the Middle East, and it too has increasing 
concerns about the Iranian nuclear program.  Although Israel’s military capabilities have 
not been analyzed throughout this thesis, it must be noted here, that “multiple reports 
suggest that Israeli leaders are contemplating a preventive military strike to remove the 
threat of an Iranian nuclear capability.”133  Israel has always had concern about Iranian 
nuclear ambitions and with Iran’s continuing advances in nuclear technology, Israel has 
become less at ease but has yet to act on its own, without U.S. support.  While Israel 
believes that a pre-emptive strike would be in its best interest, “if Israel has decided to 
strike against what Israelis see as an existential threat, it would presumable wait until the 
U.S. Congress’ return from vacation on Sept. 10.”134  Throughout history, Israel has, for 
the most part, waited for U.S. support before acting, and in the case of Iran, the situation 
would be no different.  “For its part, an Israeli military move would apparently require a 
green—or at least a yellow—light from the American administration, and this has yet to 
be given.”135  While the United States has enforced its own mechanisms of deterrence in 
order to combat Iranian nuclear ambitions, a pre-emptive attack in 2010 may not the best 
solution from the U.S. perspective, as analysts and intelligence experts believe that it will 
be at least another year until Iran would be nuclear weapon capable.   
Despite no clear solution, besides continued sanctions, to deter Iran from 
continuing with its nuclear ambitions, one fact remains clear: the United States does not 
support an Iranian nuclear program and this includes the people of America.  One poll in 
early 2010 found that 71 percent of Republicans, 66 percent of Independents, and 51 
percent of Democrats would support a U.S. bombing campaign against Iranian nuclear 
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installations.136  While this seems to be a drastic measure in order to combat Iran’s 
unclear nuclear program, it may be the only solution to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions, 
according to some experts.  Others, however, believe that attacking Iran will only close 
off any open lanes of communication between Iran and the international community, 
specifically the United States.  The “doves” also anticipate problems with increasing the 
already strict sanctions against Iran and point out that only those that directly affect the 
Iranian elite will have any significant impact; any sanctions that would ultimately target 
the civilian population of Iran would only hurt innocent bystanders and would not be 
supported by the international community. While this seems to be blatantly obvious, the 
international community and the United States must decide whether targeting the military 
and economic firms in Iran will be enough to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions.  With these 
facts in mind, Iran is guaranteed to continue to face resistance concerning its nuclear 
program not only from the United States but internationally..  Whether this resistance is 
continued in the form of stronger and more stringent sanctions, or whether the 
international community as a whole or just the United States and Israel decide to move on 
the offensive and initiate some form of attack against Iranian nuclear sites, is yet to be 
seen.   
Two votes in these most recent rounds of sanctions against Iran bring the Russian 
and Chinese relationships with Iran to the forefront, as both countries voted in favor of 
the increased sanctions.  Both Russia and China have strong economic ties with Iran and 
both supported Iran to some extent at the inception of its nuclear program.  Russian and 
Chinese officials both claim that these sanctions are only aimed at nuclear proliferation 
but will protect the economic interest of all three countries and they will not affect the 
normal life of the Iranian people nor deter their normal trade activity.137  While these 
may appear to be logical claims from the Russian and Chinese perspective, Iran make 
take their voting in favor of the increased sanctions as a sign that their partnerships may 
be crumbling.  Turkey and Brazil, both of which have significant interest in Iranian fuel, 
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voted against the increased sanctions against Iran, remaining strong Iranian allies who do 
not want to further disrupt Iranian ambitions which could ultimately place their trading 
partnership in danger.  While these two countries appear to be supportive of Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions, due to their lack of support concerning the increased sanctions, Iran 
may view the Russian and Chinese votes of “yes” to mean that Russia and China are 
siding more with the United States.  With the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council all on the same page, at least at this point, concerning Iran’s nuclear 
program, Iran needs to consider this alliance before taking any action concerning 
retaliatory mechanisms against the increased sanctions.   
The majority of the international community, specifically the United States and 
Israel, do not support Iranian nuclear ambitions, which is evident from the most recent 
round of sanctions placed upon Iran.  Russian and Chinese support of curbing Iranian 
nuclear ambitions only adds further to the realization that the majority of the international 
community does not believe that Iran is pursuing its nuclear program for peaceful 
purposes only.  While Iran may believe that it is being unfairly scrutinized by the United 
States and Israel, the fact that the majority of the international community agrees, may 
hinder Iran from initiating a retaliatory mechanism such as closing the Strait of Hormuz.  
If Iran essentially would be standing on its own in a fight against both UN and U.S. 
sanctions, Iran will have to think long and hard about the strategic outcomes of its actions 
before reacting.   
B. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
Aside from the fact that the majority of the international community does not 
support Iran in its continuing nuclear advancements, which may force Iran to vacillate 
before deciding to ever close the Strait of Hormuz, a closure of the Strait would have a 
significant effect on the Iranian economy, which may also be a hindrance to such an 
action.  As has been explained in Chapter II, the Strait of Hormuz is the one of the most 
important chokepoints in the world as “oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz account for 
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roughly 40% of all world traded oil.”138  While other Middle Eastern countries profit 
from exports that transit this chokepoint, the Iranian economy thrives from the revenue of 
its exports that transit the Strait.   
Iranian oil exports account for almost half of Iran’s government revenue,139 the 
majority of which much transit the Strait of Hormuz.  With Iran’s continual dependence 
on revenue from its crude oil and crude oil derivative exports and with the Strait being its 
primary vehicle of delivery, a closure of the Strait would directly and significantly wreak 
havoc on the Iranian economy.  While Iran has been and continues to look for and 
introduce new tactics that will support continuous and lofty state revenue, “its chronic 
economic mismanagement has made it extremely dependent on a few refineries.”140  
Economically speaking, if Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz it would negatively 
affect its own economy.  Its own oil and LNG exports would not be able to pass through 
the Strait of Hormuz, either due to mines, which Iran would most likely deploy 
throughout the waters of the Strait and Persian Gulf, as was seen in the Iraq-Iran War, or 
from international military action taken against Iran itself as well as its oil terminals.   
Either way, the Iranian economy would suffer from such an endeavor and Iran must 
analyze its economic situation and the loss of revenue that would ensue from a closure of 
the Strait.  Along with losing revenue, Iran also must take into account its imports.  One 
of significant importance is gasoline, which Iran imports from China, Russia, and India, 
via the Strait of Hormuz.  If the Strait were closed, Iran’s trading partners would not be 
able to export their natural resources to Iran nor would they be inclined to send their 
cargo ships through mined waters.  Without this precious commodity, everyday Iranian 
life would be drastically altered for the worse as Iranian refining capabilities are minimal 
at best.  A closure of the Strait of Hormuz would, without question, negatively affect the 
Iranian economy, both concerning Iran’s imports and exports, but the real question is 
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whether Iran would be willing to incur such a great cost in order to send a message to the 
international community by closing the Strait.   
One of the main purposes for an Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz would be 
to wreak havoc in the international oil market.  While such an action would hurt the 
economies of oil importing trading partners of the Gulf countries, it would also 
significantly impair the economies of the majority of the GCC states.  Among the GCC 
countries,  
The oil share in the economy increased from 30.8 percent of GDP in 2002 
to 40 percent in 2006…oil revenues constituted 86 percent of total 
government revenue in 2006 in comparison to the 2002 figure of 77.4 
percent…over the same period, oil contributions to exports also increased 
from 61 to 67 percent.141 
These statistics highlight just how dependent the GCC states, as a whole, have been on 
their oil exports in the past with no real change predicted for the near future.  As Iran is 
attempting to diversify its sources of revenue, so too are the GCC states, however, their 
progress, similar to Iran’s, is slow in coming.  While Saudi Arabia and Oman may have 
the least worry concerning a closure of the Strait, as they both have alternate means, 
either land pipelines, or different waterways, to export their natural resources, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, almost strictly rely on the Strait of Hormuz to export their 
oil.  An Iranian closure of the Strait would cripple the economies of the majority of the 
GCC states, but as they have a partnership for collective security, a closure would affect 
them all.  While Iran’s intention of a closure may not be to harm its Middle East 
neighbors, the fact remains that without free and fair passage through the Strait of 
Hormuz, the economies of the GCC countries, as a whole, would suffer significantly.  
While the GCC prefer peaceful solutions to problems in their area of the world, 
specifically concerning Iran, if Iran was the catalyst to a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, 
the GCC states may have to rethink their stance on being “opposed to any tension in the 
region, and …not want[ing] to see new wars that would bring [them] back to the past 
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cycle of violence.”142  Along with analyzing the extent to which its own economy would 
be affected if the Strait were closed, Iran must also take into account how such a closure 
would affect the economies of its Middle Eastern neighbors and the potential reactions 
from the six countries as well as those of their international allies. 
C. MILITARY CONSEQUENCES 
If Iran were to close the Strait of Hormuz, its military would take on an increased 
and sustained role throughout the area and into the Persian Gulf.  While Iran has 
experienced significant upgrades to its military equipment since the end of the Iraq-Iran 
War, its total force is, almost without question, less significant than that of the United 
States’ military.  Iran’s total military force consists of approximately 418,000 members, 
divided between the army, IRGC, navy, and air force, compared to the United States’ 
military strength of over one million members, divided between the army, air force, navy, 
Marine Corps, and Special Forces.  On sheer numbers alone, Iranian forces are miniscule 
in comparison to the United States’.  And the fact that the U.S. military training programs 
are the best in the world, while Iran’s can be considered only average, does not bode well 
for an Iranian military victory over U.S. military forces in any conflict.   Numbers and 
training, while significantly important, are not the only components that determine the 
outcome of any conflict.  Technological advances in military equipment and their 
deployment are key components to effectively becoming victorious in any conflict and 
unfortunately for Iran, the United States has them beat on this front as well. 
In order for Iran to effectively conduct a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian 
naval forces would be relied upon heavily.  Attacks on vessels transiting the Strait and the 
deployment of mines would be Iran’s most effective weapons in attempting to close the 
Strait, as was seen during the Iran-Iran War.  One positive aspect for Iran is that it 
“possesses a larger stockpile of missiles and mines ten times as powerful as those used in 
the tanker wars of the 1980s, the last period of sustained naval conflict in the gulf.”143  
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With these increased weapons, the 229 ships that were attacked by Iran during between 
1984 and 1998 will be minuscule compared to vessels that Iran would be able to attack 
once the United States retaliated after an Iranian closure of the Strait.  Iran possesses 
vehicles to deploy such missiles in its coastal combatant vessels and Boghammers, which 
are also stocked with recoilless rifles and rocket launchers and with its proximity to the 
narrowest point within the Strait of Hormuz, Iran would be able to deploy its 165 
kilogram warheads with active and inertial guidance from land sites as well.   
Among Iran’s other naval assets which would be required if Iran closed the Strait 
of Hormuz are its three Kilo class submarines.  These submarines would be a crucial 
element to the success of a closure because they would be able to harass and interdict any 
shipping transiting the Strait or the Persian Gulf.  Aside from its Exocets, Iran over the 
past several years, has been testing new missile systems, one in particular being the 
Kowsar.  Iran claimed to be testing this missile, “with a very large warhead and 
extremely high speed to attack “big ships and submarines” that it claimed could evade 
radar and antimissile missiles.”144  If such advancements in new Iranian weapons systems 
are true, this would only increase Iran’s willingness to want to close the Strait, as Iran 
would have more effective fighting tools.  While Iran’s waterborne craft and missiles 
would play a significant role in a closure of the Strait, as they would be able to harass any 
shipping attempting to transit this narrow waterway, its most valuable asset may end up 
being mines.   
These mines may bring Iran the most success in a closure of the Strait because 
they would cause the international community, particularly the United States to remove 
them before the Strait would be safe to transit.  As has been noted in the previous chapter, 
U.S. experts predict that Iran has in its arsenal, at least 2000 mines and is negotiating 
with China to purchase rocket propelled mines.145  With new advances in mines, along 
with Iran’s current overwhelming supply of moored and drifting contact mines, Iran 
would pose a serious threat to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, which only legitimizes its 
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claim, that if challenged, Iran may resort to closing the Strait as a show of force 
mechanism to the international community. The fact that Iran continues to conduct 
exercises in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf also shows the capabilities of its 
forces to effectively impose a closure of the Strait, at least for a period of time.  Its 
advancements in military technology over the past three decades coupled with its show of 
force in the region does make the Iranian threat of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz a 
credible one.  However, the aim of this thesis is not to prove whether or not Iran would be 
capable of closing the Strait but rather whether it would be willing to do so based on the 
costs associated with implementing a closure.  And, militarily speaking, this may not be 
the best option for Iran.   
Iran knows that without a shadow of a doubt, if it decided to close the Strait of 
Hormuz, the U.S. military would react immediately.  And while Iran may be able to close 
the Strait for a short period of time, its military would suffer immensely.  United States 
military forces are far superior to those of Iran’s and, if Iran was not receiving revenue 
from its oil exports because the Strait would not permit safe shipping, the likelihood of 
Iran being able to sustain its military significantly diminishes.  Combating Iranian mines 
throughout the Strait may be the most challenging and timely endeavor for the United 
States, but it is far from being an impossible mission. U.S. MCM ships, although 
decreasing in number, are of superior quality and the members of the crew are highly 
trained.  Along with support from other U.S. Navy and Air Force factions, this would 
ensure that the United States could effectively clear the Strait of Iranian mines while at 
the same time protecting U.S. assets deployed in the Strait and Persian Gulf.  Iran has 
already experienced close to a total loss of all military capabilities and it has taken it 
several decades to recover.  If Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, the United States would 
inflict more damage than the Iraqis did throughout the 1980s during the Iraq-Iran War.  
The cost associated with maintaining its military, just not monetarily but also concerning 
its members, may be far too great a feat for Iran to accept.  While U.S. military forces are 
on a more stringent and fast passed deployment cycle as compared to a few decades ago, 
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the fact remains that U.S. military force numbers far exceed those of the Iranian military.  
While several U.S. ESGs, MEUs, and AEFs would be able to rotate through deployment 
cycles in order to combat an Iranian closure of the Strait, Iranian forces would be on 
station throughout the entire conflict, with little to no rest.  Such a high-paced operational 
tempo eventually would wear upon the Iranian forces and ultimately they would become 
less effective.  Any conflict brings with it personnel and equipment casualties; however, 
the costs associated with an Iranian closure of the Strait would be of a significant level, 
particularly for Iran.  Before Iran decides to close the Strait of Hormuz, it needs to ask 
itself whether thousands of possible personnel casualties along with severe degradation to 
its military equipment are worth it.   
D. STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES 
At this point in this research, it is apparent that an Iranian closure of the Strait of 
Hormuz would negatively affect the Iranian economy as well as its military; and, 
strategically speaking, the same negative consequence would result.  An overwhelming 
amount of oil transits the Strait in order to be delivered to a majority of the international 
community and an “Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz tops the list of global-energy 
security nightmares.”146  The international community, as a whole, relies on the oil that 
comes from the countries of the Persian Gulf. If the safe and unimpeded transit of the 
waterway through which the majority of this precious commodity is transported is 
challenged, the international community would experience a severe supply shock.  There 
is no question that the international community would react to a closure of the Strait of 
Hormuz and, if Iran was the catalyst for such an action, the international favorable 
perception of Iran would significantly diminish.  The majority of the international 
community already has its reservations about Iran, specifically concerning its nuclear 
program; an outright closure of the Strait, which would cripple the economies of many 
countries around the globe, would only solidify the already less-than-desirable 
international view of Iran.   
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While a United States or Israeli attack on Iran may not be supported by the 
international community, the fact remains that countries throughout the world depend on 
the oil that transits the Strait of Hormuz from its Middle Eastern trading partners.  While 
Iran’s closure of the Strait would be to shock the world, while simultaneously wreaking 
havoc in the oil market, it still may not be a justified response in the eyes of the 
international community.  Neither the United States nor Israel depends primarily on 
Middle Eastern oil to sustain their energy needs.  The United States depends significantly 
on Canada and Mexico, while Israel relies on a myriad of trading partners, with multiple 
trading partners lying outside the Middle East.  Even though Israel has relied on countries 
inside the Middle East for its oil imports, the Strait of Hormuz was not the vehicle for 
delivery.  Currently, with “one in every four liters of Israeli oil imports com[ing] from 
Kazakhstan,”147 a closure of the Strait would not affect Israel’s supply on this end either.  
Despite the fact that the United States and Israel do not receive the majority of their oil 
from countries surrounding the Persian Gulf, the cost of their oil imports would still 
increase if Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz; however, they would still receive their oil in 
order to sustain their energy sectors, whereas other countries throughout the world, 
specifically those in Asia, would not.  Paying a higher price for oil vice not being able to 
import any is the lesser of two evils, and—with the United States and Israel getting the 
better end of the deal—an Iranian closure of the Strait may increase the already strained 
Iranian and international community relations.   
Iran must consider the response from the GCC states before deciding to close the 
Strait of Hormuz as well.  As has been mentioned previously in this chapter, the GCC 
states prefer to have peaceful relations with Iran but if Iran cut off the majority of the 
GCC states’ revenue from oil exports this would not assist in maintaining amenable 
relations between the countries surrounding the Persian Gulf.  With already questionable 
Iranian relations with the UAE over island occupation, any move by Iran that would 
ultimately harm the GCC states as a whole, will not be overlooked.  While a definitive 
consensus among the GCC states concerning offensive maneuvers in and around the 
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Persian Gulf are seemingly “off the table” concerning Iran, the Bahraini foreign minister 
has said “that his country will not just look on in the case it comes under any attack.”148  
With the U.S. naval base in its territory, Bahrain must consider the fact that if the United 
States, Israel, and Iran do enter into a conflict, Iran may decide to target U.S. forces in 
Manama.  The GCC states have strong relations with the United States and, while they 
want to reconcile any disagreements with Iran peacefully, there is no question that if a 
conflict breaks out in the Persian Gulf, the GCC states will have no other choice but to be 
immersed in it.  If, along with closing the Strait, Iran begins to target GCC states, the 
GCC will undoubtedly side with U.S. forces in order to protect their collective security.  
If it is Iran’s goal to become the hegemon in the region, then such offensive actions 
toward its Middle East neighbors may be an acceptable means to an end for Iran, but Iran 
must not forget that U.S. forces will join with GCC forces if possible in order to ensure 
that such a transition never comes to fruition for the Iranian government.  With Iran’s 
already aggressive, stubborn, and hegemonic tendencies in the region compared to the 
GCC’s methods of talks, compromise, and peaceful negotiations, the time may come 
when these GCC tactics become completely ineffective.  Aside from GCC military 
strength, with or without U.S. support, Iran must take into account what its relationship 
with its closest neighbors will become if it targets them either economically or militarily.   
E. CONCLUSION 
If Iran decided to close the Strait of Hormuz as a retaliatory mechanism (in 
reaction to either greater U.S. and UN sanctions or a pre-emptive attack aimed at its 
nuclear program by the United States or Israel), it would face severe economic, military, 
and strategic consequences.  With the majority of Iran’s state revenue coming from its oil 
exports, its ever-developing armed forces, and its already strained relationship with the 
majority of the international community, closing the Strait may bring about more 
negative than positive consequences for Iran.  Iran has yet to develop programs to 
diversify its means of gaining revenue. With oil as its primary means of such revenue, 
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closing the Strait would ensure that Iran would not receive the money it needs to sustain 
its economy from its oil trading partners.  On the military front, Iran has advanced its 
technologies and equipment over the last several decades but, compared to U.S. military 
forces, Iran still does not have the advantage.  While closing the Strait may be possible 
for Iran for a short period of time, the U.S. military would prevail in a conflict with Iran 
in order to re-open the Strait at a great cost to the Iranian armed forces.  With 
international mistrust concerning the Iranian nuclear program already at the height of 
world concerns, an Iranian closure of the Strait would only enrage the majority of the 
international community, as their economies would severely suffer without its oil imports 
from the Persian Gulf.  While an Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz would send a 
strong signal to the entire world of the Iranian commitment to protect its own interests, as 
well as to show its strength as an international power with respect to controlling oil 
exports from the Persian Gulf, the question becomes, at what cost?  Iran would harm its 
own economy by not receiving oil revenue, it would ultimately fail in a military conflict 
with the United States, either with or without GCC support, and it would continue to lose 
any trust that the majority of the international community has in it.  Based on these 
negative economic, military, and strategic consequences for Iran, closing the Strait of 
Hormuz does not appear to be a logical or worthwhile endeavor to undertake, as Iran 
would ultimately do more harm to itself than to the rest of the world.   
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